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Healthcare Reform’s Mandatory Medical
Loss Ratio: Constitutionality, Policy,
and Implementation
By WESLEY D. MARKHAM*
The business [the insurance companies are] in is health insur-
ance for a profit. They are trying to insure as many people as they
can as affordably as they can so that they make a profit and so that
the patients get covered. Obama is wiping the profit out. Obama is
purposely trying to destroy the private health insurance industry so
that government’s the only option people have, five, ten years from
now. That’s the objective. And by telling them that they must
devote 80% of their profits to X? He’s got no right to do that. It’s
totally unconstitutional.
—Rush Limbaugh, noted conservative
pundit, on the medical loss ratio
(“MLR”)1
In effect, the onerous obligations under the Reid Bill, [an ear-
lier version of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act with
similar MLR provisions], would convert private health insurance
companies into virtual public utilities. This action is not only a
source of real anxiety but also a decision of constitutional propor-
tions, for it systematically strips the regulated health-insurance issu-
ers of their constitutional entitlement to earn a reasonable rate of
return on the massive amounts of capital that they have already
invested in building out their businesses.
—Richard Epstein, prominent legal
scholar, on the MLR2
* Judicial clerk to the Honorable Legrome Davis, U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania. J.D., NYU School of Law. I would like to thank Deborah Bachrach
and Joe Baker for their open-mindedness and support. All errors are, of course, my own.
1. Alex Toole, “Rush”ing to Conclusions. . .Without the Evidence, 2028BLOG (Feb. 1,
2011), http://2028blog.com/2011/02/01/196/ (quoting Rush Limbaugh’s Jan 17, 2011
broadcast).
2. Richard A. Epstein, Impermissible Ratemaking in Health-Insurance Reform: Why the Reid
Bill is Unconstitutional 2 (Univ. of Chi. Law & Econ., Olin, Working Paper No. 506, 2009;
Univ. of Chi., Pub. Law, Working Paper No. 288, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/ab-
stract=1527128 (analyzing the constitutionality of the first version of the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act, also known as the “Reid Bill”).
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Introduction
AS A GENERAL RULE, I do not give much credence to Rush
Limbaugh’s interpretation of the law. However, when Richard Epstein
shares his view, perhaps there’s something to it. Both Limbaugh and
Epstein oppose the medical loss ratio (“MLR”) provisions in the re-
cently enacted healthcare reform legislation, and after investigating
the matter myself, I can see their point. This Article attempts to bring
public and congressional attention to the often-overshadowed MLR
issue. If Congress revisits healthcare reform in the coming years, our
legislators should leave the MLR mandate out of any new law. Impos-
ing a nationwide, mandatory MLR on the health insurance industry is
bad policy and likely unconstitutional.
On March 23, 2010, President Obama signed the Patient Protec-
tion and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”)3 into law.4 The New York Times
heralded the new legislation as “landmark health care overhaul—the
most expansive social legislation enacted in decades.”5 As Vice Presi-
dent Joe Biden less eloquently put it, “this is a big [expletive] deal.”6
The ACA is certainly a big deal, but at 906 pages in length, it’s also just
plain big.7 And like any big bill that revamps something as critical as
healthcare, the ACA has problems. Imposing a mandatory MLR on
private health insurance providers is one of those problems.
In a broad sense, the ACA’s various provisions can be analyzed
along two axes: constitutionality and policy. Some provisions are un-
doubtedly both constitutional and good policy. The drastic expansion
of Medicaid8 and the creation of health insurance exchanges9 fall
3. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010) [hereinafter ACA].
4. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Robert Pear, A Stroke of a Pen, Make That 20, and It’s
Official, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2010, at A19.
5. Id.
6. Id. (quoting Vice President Biden whispering congratulations to President
Obama).
7. See generally ACA, 124 Stat. at 119–1024.
8. See GEORGETOWN UNIV. CTR. FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, SUMMARY OF MEDICAID,
CHIP, AND LOW-INCOME PROVISIONS IN HEALTH CARE REFORM 2–3 (2010) [hereinafter Sum-
mary], available at http://ccf.georgetown.edu/index/cms-filesystem-action?file=ccf%20
publications/health%20reform/health%20reform%20summary.pdf (indicating that the
health reform will expand Medicaid coverage for children, non-elderly adults, and elderly
adults if their individual or family income is below given percentages of the federal poverty
level).
9. See Initial Guidance to States on Exchanges, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
http://www.hhs.gov/ociio/regulations/guidance_to_states_on_exchanges.html (last vis-
ited Apr. 11, 2011) (“An Exchange is a mechanism for organizing the health insurance
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within this category. Other provisions may embody sound policy deci-
sions but arguably overstep the constitutional line. The individual
mandate is the paradigmatic example.10 Still other provisions might
be both unconstitutional and bad policy. The ACA’s MLR mandate is
just such a provision.
Part I of this Article presents an overview of the ACA’s MLR provi-
sions, as well as the current controversy surrounding these new re-
quirements. Part II evaluates, and ultimately questions, the
constitutionality of the MLR provisions. Part III sets forth policy-based
arguments for and against setting a mandatory MLR in the health in-
surance industry, proposing that the ACA will detrimentally “anchor”
insurance providers to the arbitrary minimum MLR required by the
law. This anchoring will simultaneously cause “low MLR” providers to
raise their MLRs to comply with the law (the intended effect of the
law) and “high MLR” providers to drift downward towards the new,
national MLR standard (an unintended negative consequence of the
law). Finally, Part IV details the practical steps that insurance provid-
ers, state governments, and the federal government should take to im-
plement the new MLR laws.
I. The ACA’s MLR Mandate: Overview and Current Events
A. The MLR Under the ACA
In general terms, a health insurance company’s “medical loss ra-
tio” is the percentage of premium revenue the company spends on
“direct care for patients and efforts to improve care quality.”11 A short
hypothetical will illustrate the MLR calculation. Suppose Health Insur-
ance Company X insures 100 consumers, and each consumer pays the
company $10,000 per year for his coverage. It follows that Company
X’s premium revenue for the year totals $1,000,000.12 If Company X
marketplace to help consumers and small businesses shop for coverage in a way that per-
mits easy comparison of available plan options based on price, benefits and services, and
quality.”).
10. See generally State Legislation and Actions Challenging Certain Health Reforms, 2011,
NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/?tabid=18906 (last visited
Apr. 11, 2011) (summarizing the legislative efforts and judicial proceedings challenging
the individual mandate).
11. Medical Loss Ratio, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/
ociio/regulations/medical_loss_ratio.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2011).
12. 100 customers multiplied by $10,000 per year equals $1,000,000 per year.
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pays out $700,000 to cover its 100 consumers’ annual medical ex-
penses, then the company’s MLR equals 70%.13
The ACA sets, for the first time, nationwide minimum MLR re-
quirements that all health insurance issuers must meet.14 The ACA’s
MLR legislation contains several important interlocking provisions.
First, the new law requires each health insurance issuer to submit an
annual report to the Secretary of Health and Human Services
(“SHHS”) detailing how the issuer spends its money.15 Specifically,
the report must include the percentage of total premium revenue the
issuer spends ‘‘(1) on reimbursement for clinical services provided to
enrollees under such coverage; (2) for activities that improve health
care quality; and (3) on all other non-claims costs, including an expla-
nation of the nature of such costs, and excluding Federal and State
taxes and licensing or regulatory fees.”16 In other words, issuers must
report their MLRs to the federal government.
Second, and most importantly, the ACA mandates that every
health insurance issuer maintain its MLR above a certain benchmark:
85% in the large group market and 80% in the small group and indi-
vidual markets.17 The ACA calculates the MLR as the “ratio of the
amount of premium revenue expended by the issuer on [reimburse-
ment for clinical services and activities that improve health care qual-
ity] to the total amount of premium revenue [after various
exclusions].”18 If an insurance company’s MLR falls below the 80% or
85% threshold, the company must send rebates to the people it
insures.19
Clearly, the MLR calculation, and therefore an insurance pro-
vider’s compliance with the law, depends heavily on the definition of
13. $700,000 in direct care for patients divided by $1,000,000 in total premium reve-
nue equals 70%.
14. See ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 10101(f), 124 Stat. 119, 885–87 (2010) (amending
Public Health Service Act § 2718, codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-18)).
15. Id. at 885–86 (amending Public Health Service Act § 2718(a), codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. 300gg-18).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 886 (amending Public Health Service Act § 2718(b)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C. 300gg-
18). The large group market includes group health plans maintained by employers having
“an average of at least 101 employees.” Id. § 1304(b)(1), 124 Stat. at 172. The small group
market includes group health plans maintained by employers having “at least 1 but not
more than 100 employees.” Id. § 1304(b)(2), 124 Stat. at 172. The individual market in-
cludes health insurance plans offered to individuals outside of the aforementioned group
health plans. See id. § 1304(a), 124 Stat. at 171.
18. Id. § 10101(f), 124 Stat. at 886 (amending Public Health Service Act
§ 2718(b)(1)(A), codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 300gg-18).
19. Id.
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vague terms such as “activities that improve health care quality.”20 Un-
certainty is costly, especially for businesses that must structure their
operations to conform to a web of government regulations. Anticipat-
ing this potential problem, Congress required the National Associa-
tion of Insurance Commissioners (“NAIC”) to define the activities that
would improve health care quality and thus fall within the numerator
of the MLR equation.21
Under the ACA, each state has the option to raise its own mini-
mum MLR requirements above the federal benchmarks.22 Congress
directs the states to “seek to ensure adequate participation by health
insurance issuers, competition in the health insurance market in the
State, and value for consumers so that premiums are used for clinical
services and quality improvements” when determining the appropri-
ate MLR.23 This statutory language suggests that Congress sought to
accommodate several competing policy goals by enacting a minimum
MLR requirement: participation by insurance providers, competition
among insurance providers, and value for health insurance consum-
ers. The ACA’s minimum MLR provision went into effect on January
1, 2011.24
Through its complicated language, the ACA’s MLR legislation
produces a simple result: capping insurance company profits. Suppose
an insurance company has absolutely no expenses—an entirely un-
realistic assumption for any business, but useful for purposes of expla-
nation. The ACA caps the company’s profit margin at 15% in the
large group market and 20% in the small group and individual mar-
kets. More realistically, if the company spends 10% of its premium
revenue on administrative costs, then the ACA effectively limits the
company’s profit margin to 5% in the large group market and 10% in
the small group and individual markets. In an extreme example, con-
sider a company that cannot, or will not, reduce its administrative
costs to below 20% of its revenue. The ACA’s MLR provisions ensure
that this company will make no profit in the small group and individual
markets and will lose 5% in the large group market, essentially forcing
20. Id.
21. Id. at 887 (amending Public Health Service Act § 2718(c), codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. 300gg-18).
22. Id. at 886 (amending Public Health Service Act § 2718(b)(1)(A), codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. 300gg-18).
23. Id. at 887 (amending Public Health Service Act § 2718(b)(2), codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. 300gg-18).
24. Id. at 886 (amending Public Health Service Act § 2718(b)(1)(A), codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. 300gg-18).
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the company out of business. This profit capping represents a severe,
potentially unconstitutional, intrusion into the private health insur-
ance industry, a topic developed in detail in Part II below.
To mitigate the new MLR law’s harsh effects discussed in the im-
mediately preceding paragraph, the ACA does provide a “safety valve”
to alleviate some of the foreseeable problems associated with the MLR
requirements. Specifically, the SHHS has discretion to adjust the MLR
benchmark rates in two situations: (1) in the small group and individ-
ual markets of a state, “if the Secretary determines that [an 80% MLR]
may destabilize the individual market in such State;”25 and (2) “if the
Secretary determines appropriate on account of the volatility of the
individual market due to the establishment of State Exchanges.”26
Neither of these safety valves applies to the large group market, and
both vest ultimate authority in the SHHS.
To qualify for the MLR adjustment under the first safety valve, “a
state must demonstrate that requiring insurers in its individual market
to meet the 80% MLR has a likelihood of destabilizing the individual
market and result in fewer choices for consumers.”27 As of September
12, 2011, sixteen states (Maine, New Hampshire, Nevada, Kentucky,
Florida, Georgia, North Dakota, Iowa, Louisiana, Kansas, Delaware,
Indiana, Michigan, Texas, Oklahoma, and North Carolina) and the
territory of Guam have requested MLR adjustments.28 Maine’s request
was granted on March 8, 2011;29 New Hampshire’s and Nevada’s re-
quests were partially granted on May 13, 2011;30 Kentucky’s and
25. Id. (amending Public Health Service Act § 2718(b)(1)(A)(ii), codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. 300gg-18).
26. Id. at 887 (amending Public Health Service Act § 2718(d), codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. 300gg-18).
27. Medical Loss Ratio, CTR. FOR CONSUMER INFO. & INS. OVERSIGHT, http://cciio.cms.
gov/programs/marketreforms/mlr/index.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2011) [hereinafter
CTR. FOR CONSUMER INFO. & INS. OVERSIGHT].
28. Id.
29. Letter from Steven B. Larsen, Deputy Adm’r & Dir., Ctr. for Consumer Info. &
Ins. Oversight, to Mila Kofman, Me. Superintendent of Ins., at 2, 18 (Mar. 8, 2011), http://
cciio.cms.gov/programs/marketreforms/mlr/states/maine/maine_decision_letter_3_8_
11.pdf.
30. Letter from Steven B. Larsen, Deputy Adm’r & Dir., Ctr. for Consumer Info. &
Ins. Oversight, to Roger A. Sevigny, Comm’r N.H. Ins. Dep’t, at 2, 18 (May 13, 2011),
http://cciio.cms.gov/programs/marketreforms/mlr/nh_mlr_adj_decletter.pdf (authoriz-
ing a MLR reduction in New Hampshire to 72% in 2011, 75% in 2012, and the 80% statu-
tory standard in 2013, despite New Hampshire’s request for a reduction to 70% from 2011
through 2013); Letter from Steven B. Larsen, Deputy Adm’r & Dir., Ctr. for Consumer
Info. & Ins. Oversight, to Brett J. Barrett, Nev. Comm’r Ins., at 2, 12 (May 13, 2011), http:/
/cciio.cms.gov/programs/marketreforms/mlr/states/nevada/
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Iowa’s requests were partially granted on July 22, 2011;31 North Da-
kota’s and Delaware’s petitions were denied on July 22, 2011 and Sep-
tember 9, 2011, respectively;32 and the other ten requests remain
pending.33
Pursuant to the statute,34 the Department of Health and Human
Services (“HHS”) promulgated regulations regarding the implementa-
tion of the ACA’s MLR requirements.35 Like the ACA itself, these reg-
ulations are long (seventy-two pages) and complicated.36 According to
the HHS, “[t]he medical loss ratio regulation outlines disclosure and
reporting requirements, how insurance companies will calculate their
medical loss ratio and provide rebates, and how adjustments could be
made to the medical loss ratio standard to guard against market
destabilization.”37 The regulations closely track the recommendations
formulated by the NAIC “after months of meetings and debate involv-
mlr_adj_decision_letter_5_13_11.pdf (approving a MLR reduction in Nevada to 75% in
2011, despite Nevada’s request for a reduction to 72% in 2011).
31. Letter from Steven B. Larsen, Deputy Adm’r & Dir., Ctr. for Consumer Info. &
Ins. Oversight, to Sharon P. Clark, Ky. Comm’r Ins., at 2, 13 (July 22, 2011), http://
cciio.cms.gov/programs/marketreforms/mlr/states/Kentucky/
ky_mlr_adj_determination_letter.pdf (authorizing a MLR reduction in Kentucky to 75% in
2011 and the 80% statutory standard of in 2013, despite Kentucky’s request for a reduction
to 65%, 70%, and 75% for 2011, 2012, and 2013, respectively); Letter from Steven B. Lar-
sen, Deputy Adm’r & Dir., Ctr. for Consumer Info. & Ins. Oversight, to Susan E. Voss, Iowa
Comm’r Ins., at 2, 11 (July 22, 2011), http://cciio.cms.gov/programs/marketreforms/
mlr/states/iowa/ia_mlr_adj_determination_letter.pdf (authorizing a MLR reduction in
Iowa to 67% in 2011, 75% for 2012, and the 80% statutory standard in 2013, despite Iowa’s
request for a reduction to 60%, 70%, and 75% for 2011, 2012, and 2013, respectively).
32. Letter from Steven B. Larsen, Deputy Adm’r & Dir., Ctr. for Consumer Info. &
Ins. Oversight, to Adam W. Hamm, N.D. Ins. Comm’r, at 2, 10–11 (July 22, 2011), http://
cciio.cms.gov/programs/marketreforms/mlr/states/northdakota/
nd_mlr_adj_determination_letter.pdf; Letter from Steven B. Larsen, Deputy Adm’r & Dir.,
Ctr. for Consumer Info. & Ins. Oversight, to Karen Weldin Stewart, Del. Comm’r, at 2, 10
(Sept. 9, 2011), http://cciio.cms.gov/programs/marketreforms/mlr/states/delaware/
de_mlr_adj_determination_letter.pdf.
33. CTR. FOR CONSUMER INFO. & INS. OVERSIGHT, supra note 27.
34. ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 10101(f), 124 Stat. 119, 887 (2010) (“The Secretary
shall promulgate regulations for enforcing the provisions of this section and may provide
for appropriate penalties.”)) (amending Public Health Service Act § 2718(b)(3), codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. 300gg-18).
35. Health Insurance Issuers Implementing Medical Loss Ratio (MLR) Requirements
Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (Interim Final Rule), 75 Fed. Reg.
74,864 (Dec. 1, 2010) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 158) [hereinafter MLR Regulations],
available at http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2010/pdf/2010-29596.pdf].
36. See id.
37. New Affordable Care Act Rules Give Consumers Better Value for Insurance Premiums, U.S.
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (Nov. 22, 2010), http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2010
pres/11/20101122a.html.
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ing industry and consumer representatives.”38 As a general matter,
consumer advocates praised the regulations, while insurance compa-
nies criticized them.39
A comprehensive review of the MLR regulations is beyond the
scope of this Article. However, it is worth mentioning several of the
more important and controversial aspects of the regulations to pro-
vide background for the in-depth constitutional and policy-based dis-
cussions that follow. First, the regulations make special allowances for
“mini-med” plans, i.e., limited-benefit policies that only cover up to
$250,000 a year.40 In essence, mini-med plans can satisfy the 80% MLR
requirement by spending only 40% on medical costs.41 Consumer ad-
vocates detest these mini-med plans, claiming that they “[leave] often
unsuspecting customers to fend for themselves if they develop a costly
and serious disease.”42
Second, the regulations spell out which expenses “count” as med-
ical spending for the purposes of calculating the MLR. Naturally, the
insurance industry advocated for a broad definition of activities that
improve health care quality.43 The broader the definition, the easier it
is to meet the minimum MLR requirement. In particular, insurers lob-
bied to include “the cost of paying claims, signing up doctors to their
networks or running customer service call centers” in the numerator
of the MLR equation.44 Ultimately, the regulations disappointed the
health insurance industry. While the regulations permit insurers to
count certain quality improvement costs and payments to health care
providers (doctors, nurses, and hospitals) as medical expenses, the
regulations classify broker commissions as administrative costs, which
are excluded from the MLR numerator.45
38. Julie Appleby, New Law’s Health Insurance Regulations Could Mean Rebates For Con-
sumers, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Nov. 22, 2010), http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Stories/
2010/November/22/mlr-sebelius-medical-loss-ratio-insurance.aspx.
39. See id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. N.C. Aizenman & Robert Barnes, Controversial “Mini-med” Plans to Get Reprieves
Through Waivers, WASH. POST, Mar. 27, 2011, at A15.
43. Appleby, supra note 38.
44. Id.
45. Id.; accord Katherine Hobson, HHS Releases Final Medical Loss Ratio Regulations,
WALL ST. J. HEALTH BLOG (Nov. 22, 2010, 9:54 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/health/2010/
11/22/hhs-releases-final-medical-loss-ratio-regulations/.
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B. Current Controversy: What’s In and What’s Out?
The definitional distinction between medical and non-medical
expenses drives the MLR debate.46 An insurance company’s costs asso-
ciated with “activities that improve health care quality” count towards
the 80% or 85% MLR requirements; non-medical, administrative ex-
penses do not. Three categories of expenses have drawn especially
heavy scrutiny: (1) brokers’ commissions, discussed briefly above, (2)
federal and state taxes, and (3) anti-fraud efforts.
1. Brokers’ Commissions
Insurance brokers “are independent agents who receive commis-
sions from an insurer for selling insurance products.”47 Brokers pro-
vide a valuable service to both health insurance issuers and health
insurance consumers. For example, brokers (1) help employers de-
sign the “right” plan(s) for their employees; (2) comparison shop to
get the best possible price for their clients; (3) explain the costs and
benefits of the plan(s) to the insured; (4) resolve claims-related
problems; and (5) refer customers to health insurance providers,
thereby allowing the insurance companies to limit marketing-related
expenses.48
Health insurance brokers lobbied to have their commissions ex-
cluded from the MLR equation.49 Specifically, the brokers expressed
concern that if their commissions counted as administrative expenses
in the MLR calculation, “insurers would cut their pay to improve med-
ical loss ratios.”50 The brokers’ concerns appear warranted. Facing the
prospect of a mandatory minimum MLR, many health insurance issu-
ers have already reduced broker commissions by up to 50%.51 Addi-
tionally, state insurance agencies worried that they would be flooded
with calls for help if the MLR pushed too many brokers out of busi-
ness.52 Nonetheless, the brokers lost this battle, at least for the time
46. See Jennifer Haberkorn, Health Policy Brief, Updated: Medical Loss Ratios, HEALTH
AFFAIRS (Nov. 24, 2010), http://www.healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief.php?brief_
id=33 (discussing the MLR debate).
47. LESLIE J. CONWELL, CTR. FOR STUDYING HEALTH SYS. CHANGE, THE ROLE OF HEALTH
INSURANCE BROKERS 2 (2002).
48. See id.
49. See Haberkorn, supra note 46.
50. Id.
51. Bob Graham, Agents Say Their Commissions Should Be Exempt Medical Loss Ratios, INS.
& FIN. ADVISOR (Feb. 22, 2011), http://ifawebnews.com/2011/02/22/agents-say-their-
commissions-should-be-exempt-medical-loss-ratios/.
52. Haberkorn, supra note 46.
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being. While the NAIC decided to count commissions as administra-
tive expenses,53 it also established a working group with HHS to “en-
sure that the vital role of agents and brokers is preserved.”54
2. Federal and State Taxes
According to the ACA, the denominator of the MLR equation is
“the total amount of premium revenue (excluding Federal and State taxes
and licensing or regulatory fees).”55 A smaller denominator makes the
MLR requirement easier to meet. Therefore, insurance companies
naturally want to exclude as many taxes and fees as possible. The
NAIC took the position that “all federal taxes, such as income taxes,
except for taxes on investment income and capital gains” should be
excluded from the MLR denominator.56 This relatively broad defini-
tion favors the health insurance providers.
On the other hand, the drafters of the bill maintained that the
provision “refer[s] only to Federal taxes and fees that relate specifi-
cally to revenue derived from the provision of health insurance cover-
age that were included in the [ACA].”57 In other words, this provision
includes only federal taxes on insurers that result from implementing
the new law and excludes any other taxes. By excluding far fewer
taxes, this relatively narrow definition would make it more difficult for
insurance companies to meet the ACA’s minimum MLR require-
ments. Some critics of this position claim that such a narrow defini-
tion of the tax exclusion would amount to double-taxation of the
health insurance industry.58 Ultimately, HHS, empowered by statute
53. Id.
54. Letter from Jane Cline, Nat’l Assoc. of Ins. Comm’rs, et al., to Kathleen Sebelius,
Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. (Oct. 27, 2010), http://naic.org/documents/
committees_ex_mlr_reg_asadopted.pdf.
55. ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 10101(f), 124 Stat. 119, 886 (2010) (emphasis added)
(amending Public Health Service Act § 2718(b)(1)(A), codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
300gg-18).
56. Haberkorn, supra note 46; see, e.g., NAT’L ASSOC. OF INS. COMM’RS, REGULATION FOR
UNIFORM DEFINITIONS AND STANDARDIZED METHODOLOGIES FOR CALCULATION OF THE MEDI-
CAL LOSS RATIO FOR PLAN YEARS 2011, 2012, AND 2013 PER SECTION 2718(B) OF THE PUBLIC
HEALTH SERVICE ACT § 8(F) (Oct. 27, 2010) [hereinafter NAIC REGULATION], available at
http://naic.org/documents/committees_ex_mlr_reg_asadopted.pdf (“The denominator
used to determine the medical loss ratio for the plan year is calculated as earned premiums
less Federal and State taxes and licensing or regulatory fees.” (emphasis added)).
57. Letter from Max Baucus et al., Chairmen, U.S. Congressional Comms., to Kath-
leen Sebelius, Sec’y, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. (Aug. 10, 2010), http://www.polit-
ico.com/static/PPM170_100811_taxes.html.
58. See Douglas Holtz-Eakin, MLR Bait and Switch: PPACA’s Latest Controversy, AM. AC-
TION FORUM (Aug. 12, 2010), http://americanactionforum.org/content/mlr-bait-and-
switch-ppacas-latest-controversy.
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to promulgate MLR regulations,59 sided with the NAIC by defining
the MLR tax exclusion quite broadly in the regulations.60
3. Anti-Fraud Efforts
According to a conservative estimate of the National Health Care
Anti-Fraud Association, “3% of all health care spending—or $68 bil-
lion [in 2007]—is lost to health care fraud.”61 During the MLR de-
bate, insurance providers argued that money spent on anti-fraud
measures should qualify as expenses for “activities that improve health
care quality.”62 In other words, insurers want to put fraud prevention
expenditures in the numerator of the MLR equation, making it easier
to satisfy the minimum MLR requirement.
HHS disagreed, refusing to classify fraud-prevention activities as
quality improvement measures except for “fraud detection/recovery
expenses up to the amount recovered that reduces incurred claims.”63
Other “[e]xpenditures and activities that must not be included in
quality improving activities” include cost containment activities, ex-
penses related to running a claims adjudication system, retrospective
and concurrent utilization review, and marketing expenses.64
By largely excluding anti-fraud expenses from the MLR numera-
tor, HHS missed an opportunity to incentivize health insurance com-
panies to adopt more advanced, effective fraud prevention measures.
59. See ACA § 10101(f), 124 Stat. at 886) (“The Secretary shall promulgate regulations
for enforcing the provisions of this section and may provide for appropriate penalties”)
(amending Public Health Service Act § 2718(b)(3), codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
300gg-18).
60. MLR Regulations, supra note 35, 75 Fed. Reg. 74,864, 74,878 (Dec. 1, 2010) (to be
codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 158) (“This interim final regulation adopts the NAIC recommen-
dation that Federal income taxes on investment income and capital gains are not taxes
based on premium revenues, and thus should not be used to adjust premium revenues, as
specified in § 158.162, while all other Federal taxes allocated to health insurance coverage
should be excluded from non-claims costs for purposes of the report required by section
2718. Section 158.162 also makes clear that Federal taxes which are excluded from non-
claims costs are to be excluded from premium revenue when calculating an issuer’s
MLR.”).
61. The Problem of Health Care Fraud, NAT’L HEALTH CARE ANTI-FRAUD ASS’N, http://
www.nhcaa.org/eweb/DynamicPage.aspx?webcode=anti_fraud_resource_centr&wpscode=
TheProblemOfHCFraud (last visited July 9, 2011); see also 2009 Financial Crimes Report, FED.
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/financial-
crimes-report-2009 (last visited July 9, 2011) (“[F]raudulent billings to health care pro-
grams, both public and private, are estimated between three and ten percent of total
health care expenditures [$2.26 trillion per year].”).
62. See Haberkorn, supra note 46.
63. MLR Regulations, supra note 35, 75 Fed. Reg. at 74,924–25.
64. Id.
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A rational insurance company would likely spend more money to pre-
vent fraud if such expenditures count toward the MLR. This would be
a positive development, to the extent that ferreting out insurance
fraud produces a net social benefit. Instead, the MLR regulations dis-
courage health insurance providers from spending on fraud-preven-
tion, because incurring such costs makes it more difficult for a
provider to comply with the MLR mandate.
C. Current Events Surrounding the MLR
Passing the ACA did not end the MLR debate. States still have to
decide whether to seek an exemption from the new federal MLR re-
quirements, and Republican legislators continue to search for ways to
undermine the ACA’s MLR provisions.
1. State Requests for MLR Adjustments
As discussed above, sixteen states and the territory of Guam have
asked HHS for MLR adjustments.65 HHS recently approved or par-
tially approved Maine’s, New Hampshire’s, Nevada’s, Kentucky’s, and
Iowa’s adjustment requests. It denied North Dakota’s and Delaware’s
requests, and has not decided the remaining ten requests.66 HHS
clearly and concisely summarized the reasoning behind its decision to
grant Maine’s request as follows:
The Maine Bureau of Insurance requested an adjustment of
the 80 percent MLR to a 65 percent MLR standard. As of Septem-
ber 2010, nearly 37,000 Maine residents obtain health insurance
coverage through Maine’s individual health insurance market.
One insurer, MEGA Life & Health Insurance Company, which cov-
ers more than a third of the market or approximately 14,000
Mainers, has said it may exit the market if required to meet this higher
standard in 2011 and 2012. According to the State, since MEGA of-
fers lower cost policies in Maine’s individual market, if the insurer
left the market, consumers may not be able to purchase new poli-
cies of comparable price and benefit design. For these reasons,
HHS accepted the Maine Bureau of Insurance request for an ad-
justment to 65 percent for 2011 and 2012. HHS will allow the ad-
justment to continue through 2013, as Maine requested, if the
State provides additional data at the end of 2012 to support a third
year of the adjustment to 65 percent.67
65. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. The sixteen states are Maine, New
Hampshire, Nevada, Kentucky, Florida, Georgia, North Dakota, Iowa, Louisiana, Kansas,
Delaware, Indiana, Michigan, Texas, Oklahoma, and North Carolina. Id.
66. Id.
67. Medical Loss Ratio: Getting Your Money’s Worth on Health Insurance, The Maine MLR
Adjustment, CTR. FOR CONSUMER INFO. & INS. OVERSIGHT, http://cciio.cms.gov/programs/
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One can view this result either favorably or unfavorably, depend-
ing on one’s point of view. ACA proponents will say that HHS’s ap-
proval of Maine’s request demonstrates that the safety valve works.
The law contains sufficient safeguards to ensure that the new MLR
requirements do not force insurers out of the market, potentially de-
stabilizing it.
On the other hand, ACA opponents may claim that the Maine
experience illustrates the perils of a national minimum MLR: insur-
ance companies such as MEGA Life & Health would rather leave the
market entirely than comply with the new MLR requirements. If
enough insurers follow this course of action, the health insurance
market, or at least a significant portion of it, will dry up, leaving con-
sumers with limited options. HHS granted Maine’s and other states’
request for relief, but what about insurance providers in states that do
not seek an MLR adjustment? Or what if HHS makes a mistake and
denies a state’s valid MLR adjustment request? If this occurs, the bur-
densome MLR regulations may drive good insurers out of the market
in these states, reducing competition and consumer choice. Finally,
consumer advocates who believe the MLR provisions do not go far
enough in regulating insurance companies might complain that the
MLR adjustment safety valve allows “junk insurance” providers, such
as MEGA, to stay in business while continuing to gouge unsuspecting
customers.68
The other states that requested MLR adjustments had concerns
paralleling those expressed by Maine. Namely, these states worried
that the new 80% MLR requirement in the individual market will
cause insurance providers to exit the health insurance market, which
in turn will undermine the integrity of the market. For example, New
Hampshire stressed that a single insurance carrier dominates the indi-
vidual insurance market in the state, and smaller carriers may not par-
ticipate at all if they must comply with the federal MLR requirement.69
Nevada noted that as of September 1, 2010, three out of twenty-eight
marketreforms/mlr/medical_loss_ratio_maine.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2011) [hereinaf-
ter The Maine MLR Adjustment] (emphasis added).
68. See Drew Armstrong, Maine Wins First Waiver to Health Insurance Premium Rules,
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 8, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-03-08/maine-wins-
first-waiver-to-health-insurance-premium-rules.html (“The city of Los Angeles sued . . .
MegaLife . . . on Oct. 20 for allegedly selling ‘junk insurance’ with obscure provisions that
left customers ‘without coverage when they needed it most,’ according to court
documents.”).
69. Letter from Robert A. Sevigny, Comm’r N.H. Ins. Dep’t, to Kathleen Sebelius,
Sec’y, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., at. 1 (Jan. 6, 2011), http://cciio.cms.gov/pro-
grams/marketreforms/mlr/states/newhampshire/mlr_adj_req_01062010.pdf.
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carriers “have imposed moratoriums on new business while they deter-
mine their ultimate market strategy” and may exit the market “unless
there is some relief granted through an adjustment to the medical loss
ratio standard.”70 Similarly, Florida contended that implementing the
ACA’s new MLR standards will cause insurance companies to “exit the
individual market or cease issuing new policies,” “erect barriers to en-
try into the individual market,” “reduce consumer choice,” and “se-
verely hamper agent involvement in the individual market to the
severe detriment of Florida consumers.”71 The HHS’s decisions re-
garding the remaining MLR adjustment applications in the coming
months will shed more light on the current debate surrounding this
controversial issue.
2. Republican Party’s Efforts to Undermine the MLR
The Republican Party failed to keep the ACA from becoming law,
but that has not stopped a number of Republican legislators from con-
tinuing to battle against the ACA’s MLR mandate. For example, on
February 18, 2011, Republican Congressman Tom Price (Georgia) in-
troduced an amendment to the Full Year Continuing Appropriations
Act of 2011, so that “[n]one of the funds . . . may be used by the
[HSS] to implement or enforce section 2718 of the Public Health Ser-
vice Act [the ACA’s MLR provision].”72 Presumably, Congressman
Price proposed this amendment to stifle federal government efforts to
administer the new federal MLR regime.
On March 9, 2011, in another attack on the MLR provision, Re-
publican Congressman Carter (Texas) discussed the HHS MLR regu-
lation and then noted: “We actually have a bill that is coming before
this Congress . . . . It mandates that all new major rules must be ap-
proved by Congress before becoming law.”73 This statement not-so-
subtly implies that at least some ACA opponents will go to great
lengths to prevent the MLR regulations from taking effect, including
authorizing Congress to take a second look at the HHS regulations
before they become law. Whether critics will successfully derail the
MLR laws and/or regulations remains to be seen.
70. Letter from Brett J. Barratt, Nev. Comm’r Ins., to Kathleen Sebelius, Sec’y, Dep’t
of Health & Human Servs., at. 3 (Feb. 9, 2011) (citations omitted), http://cciio.cms.gov/
programs/marketreforms/mlr/states/nevada/mlr_letter_to_sec_sebelius_2_9_11.pdf.
71. Letter from Kevin M. McCarty, Comm’r, Fla. Office of Ins. Reg., to Kathleen Sebe-
lius, Sec’y, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., at. 2 (Mar. 11, 2011) http://cciio.cms.gov/
programs/marketreforms/mlr/states/Florida/petition_mlr_03112011_ltr_to_hhs.pdf.
72. 157 CONG. REC. H1261 (daily ed. Feb. 18, 2011) (statement of Rep. Tom Price).
73. 157 CONG. REC. H1651 (daily ed. Mar. 9, 2011) (statement of Rep. John Carter).
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3. The Rhetoric Continues
Congressional representatives on both sides of the aisle have
ramped-up the rhetoric in the MLR debate. For instance, on February
18, 2011, Representative Price introduced an amendment to the Full
Year Continuing Appropriations Act that would impede funding of
the MLR initiative.74 In justifying his proposal, Representative Price
excoriated the MLR mandate as extreme government intervention
into private industry:
Last year, this Congress made a lot of decisions that gave
Washington control over our health care system. And a perfect ex-
ample of that control is that ObamaCare mandates to the compa-
nies that provide the health coverage for individuals, helping
individuals, how to run their business. Essentially, the Federal Gov-
ernment is in the business of dictating to private companies what
they should do to run their business, what kind of coverage they
can provide, what kind of prices they can charge, what kind of defi-
nition of quality care, and what meets the definition of essential
services for individuals. It really is central planning at its finest, and
it is certainly not the government’s role in a free market system.75
Similarly, on March 9, 2011, Representative Carter spoke about
the MLR as the designee of the majority leader during debate over the
Congressional Review Act.76 Representative Carter worried that the
new MLR mandate would cause many individuals to lose their health
insurance entirely:
This [MLR] regulation requires all health plans to pay a minimum
of 80 percent of premiums toward health services. Larger insurers
should pay a minimum of 85 percent. Industry analysis estimates
that as many as 47 percent of the participants in individual and
small group plans which have higher administrative costs due to
economies of scale will lose their health insurance if this regulation
becomes law. So this one regulation, which comes out of what we
call the ObamaCare bill, could cause 47 percent of the people who
have small to midsize health care plans to lose their health care
plan.77
Democrats responded, suggesting that those who oppose the
MLR mandate are filling the pockets of insurance company execu-
tives. For example, Frank Pallone, a Democratic Congressman from
New Jersey, stated:
74. 157 CONG. REC. H1261 (daily ed. Feb. 18, 2011) (statement of Rep. Tom Price).
75. Id.
76. 157 CONG. REC. H1649–H1653 (daily ed. Mar. 9, 2011) (statement of Rep. John
Carter).
77. Id. at H1651.
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 If you’re with the gentleman from Georgia [Price], you are on
the side of the big insurance companies, and you’ll want to make
sure that they make bigger profits, that they get bigger bonuses,
that they pass out bigger dividends and more money to their
CEOs . . . . That’s what this is all about. You’re going to hand back
to the insurance companies control over what happens with the
money that you paid in your premium so they can do whatever they
want with it and make whatever profit they want. I think it’s
wrong.78
According to Republicans, “ObamaCare’s”79 MLR regulation
could cause half of the entire small group insurance market to disappear.80
According to Democrats, opposing the MLR requirement equates to
favoring greedy insurance company executives.81 This kind of fear-monger-
ing and name-calling adds no value to the legitimate debate regarding
the difficult and important issues at hand: whether or not the MLR
law is both constitutional and sound policy.
II. The Constitutionality of the ACA’s MLR Provisions
Prolific legal scholar Richard Epstein has argued that the ACA’s
MLR provisions may be unconstitutional.82 Although Epstein voiced
his concerns in December of 2009 in relation to an earlier, in-progress
version of the ACA,83 the basic structure of his constitutional analysis
applies to the version of the ACA that ultimately became law in March
of 2010. This Part attempts to flesh-out Professor Epstein’s position, in
part by examining and synthesizing several cases in which courts have
found unconstitutional government ratemaking. This Part concludes
that the ACA’s MLR provisions are likely unconstitutional.
78. 157 CONG. REC. H1262 (daily ed. Feb. 18, 2011) (statement of Rep. Frank Pallone,
Jr.).
79. “ObamaCare” is a slang term used by some when referring to the ACA. Many
consider the term derogatory. E.g., Liz White, Stewart Calls It: ‘Obamacare’ Derogatory, NEWS-
WEEK (Apr. 21, 2010), http://www.newsweek.com/blogs/the-gaggle/2010/04/21/stewart-
calls-it-obamacare-derogatory.html.
80. See supra text accompanying note 77.
81. See supra text accompanying note 78.
82. See Epstein, supra note 2 (arguing that the MLR provision would “would convert
private health insurance companies into virtual public utilities” because it “systematically
strips the regulated health-insurance issuers of their constitutional entitlement to earn a
reasonable rate of return . . . .”).
83. Id. at 1 n.1.
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A. The Constitutional Concern in Brief
Epstein bases his challenge to the ACA’s minimum MLR require-
ment in the Constitution’s Takings and Due Process Clauses.84 First,
Epstein analogizes the MLR requirement to government ratemak-
ing.85 Under the circumstances, this is a logical first step. Before the
ACA, the federal government traditionally shied away from regulating
the health insurance industry, and the Supreme Court has never ad-
dressed the MLR issue directly.86 Government ratemaking, a generic
term for government-set rates in various industries, is the closest anal-
ogy. Using the Supreme Court’s ratemaking cases for support, Epstein
derives the following principle: “A basic constitutional requirement is
that any firm in a regulated market be allowed to recover a risk-ad-
justed competitive rate of return on its accumulated capital investment.”87
Put differently, the higher the risk, the greater the constitutionally-
required rate of return.88
Epstein then makes another assumption: “[T]hat the health in-
surance industry is competitive or could easily be made competi-
tive.”89 Because the industry is competitive,90 the prevailing market
rates (including the MLR) necessarily reflect the “risk-adjusted com-
petitive rate of return” required by the Constitution.91 It follows that
any law mandating an MLR above that already prevailing in the com-
petitive health insurance marketplace violates the Constitution.92 The
ACA does just that and is therefore unconstitutional. In Epstein’s
words:
84. Id. at 20.
85. See id. at 3 (“These constitutional provisions have been subject to extensive inter-
pretation in the Supreme Court in ratemaking cases, which must be taken into account in
dealing with the legislation.”).
86. See Mila Kofman & Karen Pollitz, HEALTH POLICY INST. GEORGETOWN UNIV.,
HEALTH INSURANCE REGULATION BY STATES AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: A REVIEW OF
CURRENT APPROACHES AND PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE 1 (Apr. 2006), available at http://www.
allhealth.org/briefingmaterials/HealthInsuranceReportKofmanandPollitz-95.pdf (“The
federal government has historically respected the state’s role in regulating insurance” and
“States remain the primary regulators of insurance companies and insurance products.”).
87. Id. at 3 (citing Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299 (1988)) (emphasis
added).
88. Id. at 20 (citing Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1899)).
89. Id. at 21.
90. See id. at 23 (indicating that “[t]he unregulated rates are already at the competi-
tive level”).
91. See id. at 21 (“Once it is clear—and it is generally clear—that the health insurance
industry is competitive or could easily be made competitive, the entire rationale for govern-
ment ratemaking is undermined.”).
92. See infra text accompanying note 93.
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[I]t is impossible for the rate regulation of firms in the competitive
health insurance industry to recover the constitutionally permissi-
ble rate of return. So long as competitive rates of return remain
the constitutional benchmark, rate regulation necessarily fails. The
unregulated rates are already at the competitive level. Any system
that reduces revenues, raises costs, and increases uncertainty can-
not possibly meet the applicable constitutional standard.93
Despite Epstein’s generally sound argument against the MLR’s
constitutionality, several particular aspects of his reasoning are troub-
lesome. First, the current health insurance market is not truly “com-
petitive.” For one thing, the market is extremely concentrated.
According to a 2009 report, one single carrier controls more than half
the market in twenty-one states, and two carriers control more than
half the market in thirty-nine states.94 HHS granted Maine’s request
for an MLR adjustment primarily because one insurance carrier that
controlled over 30% of the individual market threatened to leave.95
Additionally, the cost of health insurance continues to skyrocket. In
2011, “groups of more than 20 workers have been experiencing pre-
mium increases of around 20 percent . . . while smaller groups are
seeing increases of 40 percent to 60 percent or more.”96 Although not
dispositive, market concentration and rising prices indicate that the
health insurance market is less than optimally competitive.
However, once the ACA’s health insurance exchanges take root,
the market should be competitive. Indeed, exchanges are “intended to
create a more organized and competitive market for health insurance
by offering a choice of plans, establishing common rules regarding
the offering and pricing of insurance, and providing information to
help consumers better understand the options available to them.”97
Therefore, although Epstein’s assumption of competitiveness is not
currently accurate, it will be soon once the ACA’s health insurance
exchanges are implemented. As such, Epstein’s assumption of com-
petitiveness does not doom his constitutional analysis of the ACA’s
MLR mandate.
93. Epstein, supra note 2, at 23.
94. Ben Furnas & Rebecca Buckwalter-Poza, Health Care Competition: Insurance Market
Domination Leads to Fewer Choices, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (June 2009), http://www.ameri-
canprogress.org/issues/2009/06/pdf/health_competitiveness.pdf.
95. The Maine MLR Adjustment, supra note 67.
96. Robert Pear, Health Care Premiums Soar as Coverage Shrinks, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4,
2011, at A13.
97. Explaining Health Care Reform: What Are Health Insurance Exchanges, KAISER FAMILY
FOUND. (May 2009), http://www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/7908.pdf.
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Second, under Epstein’s reasoning, the Constitution would fore-
close any rate regulation in the health insurance industry.98 Epstein be-
lieves that “the entire rationale for government ratemaking is
undermined [when the health insurance market is competitive]. The
point of ratemaking was to require the firm to accept competitive
rates of returns in a market setting where it enjoyed monopoly
power.”99 But the Constitution does not go this far. Although govern-
ment rate setting in a competitive market may be unnecessary and
unwise,100 such government intervention is constitutional unless the
government sets a rate so low as to be “confiscatory”101 or
“unreasonable.”102
Third, Epstein’s reliance on the public utility analogy contains an
internal inconsistency. On the one hand, he cites public utilities cases
such as Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch103 to show that the government
must give firms in regulated markets an opportunity to earn a “risk-
adjusted competitive rate of return.”104 On the other hand, he asserts
that government rate setting only makes sense in the context of mo-
nopolies such as public utilities, not in competitive markets, such as
the health insurance industry.105 If public utilities (monopolies) fun-
damentally differ from the health insurance industry (competitive) in
the rate regulation context, then relying on public utilities cases such
as Duquesne Light to craft a constitutional rule governing the health
insurance industry does not make much sense.
Most importantly, Epstein does not provide guidance on what
constitutes a risk-adjusted competitive rate of return. The government
may exercise significant control over the health insurance industry be-
98. See Epstein, supra note 2, at 21.
99. Id.
100. The vast majority of economists believe that profit caps and government price
controls reduce quality and distort the allocation of resources. Hugh Rockoff, Price Controls,
in THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS 409, 409 (David R. Henderson ed., 2008).
101. See, e.g., Aetna Ins. Co. v. Hyde, 275 U.S. 440, 447 (1928) (indicating that the
Supreme Court would declare a rate as confiscatory if “the facts relied on to restrain the
enforcement of rates prescribed under the sanction of state law [are] specifically set forth,
and from them it . . . clearly appear that the rates would necessarily deny to the plaintiff
just compensation and deprive it of its property without due process of law”).
102. See, e.g., KN Energy, Inc. v. Cities of Broken Bow, 505 N.W.2d 102, 107 (Neb.
1993) (“[I]n setting rates that may be charged by a utility, a state cannot set rates which are
unjust, unreasonable, and confiscatory and which, therefore, deprive the utility of property
without the due process of law guaranteed by U.S. Const. amend. XIV . . . .” (emphasis
added)).
103. 488 U.S. 299 (1988).
104. Epstein, supra note 2, at 3.
105. Id. at 21.
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cause healthcare is a vital public interest.106 Because the government
possesses broad power to supervise the insurance industry and has a
legitimate interest in regulating rates,107 “insurance companies have
no constitutional right to be regulated under ‘open competition’
laws.”108 However, as mentioned above,109 the government still cannot
impose confiscatory or unreasonable rates on insurance providers.
This begs the question: how do the courts distinguish between permis-
sible rate regulation (here, a permissible MLR law) and an unconstitu-
tional confiscatory MLR requirement? Because the courts have not
provided clear guidelines, this question remains unresolved.
B. Constitutional vs. Confiscatory
The words unreasonable and confiscatory mean nothing without
context. Therefore, courts have developed a number of principles to
analyze whether or not a government-set rate is unreasonable or con-
fiscatory, and therefore unconstitutional.
First, in the ratemaking context, the Constitution does not re-
quire the government “to fix rates which will guarantee a profit to all
insurers,” but at the same time, the government cannot “constitution-
ally fix rates which are so low that if the insurers engage in business
they may do so only at a loss.”110 In the MLR context, this means that
the government must set the minimum MLR at a level that gives insur-
ers the opportunity to make a fair profit. As Professor Epstein suggests, a
“fair profit” should account for the level of risk involved in the busi-
ness.111 Rates that merely protect insurers from insolvency112 or per-
106. See Golden Rule Ins. Co. v. Ins. Dep’t., 641 A.2d 1255, 1260 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1994) (“Our Supreme Court has held that the Commonwealth may regulate the business
of insurance, because it is a business affected with a public concern.”); Smith v. Dep’t of
Ins., 507 So.2d 1080, 1092–93 (Fla. 1987) (“We find a legitimate state interest in regulating
these insurance rates, and hold these insurance companies have no constitutional right to
be regulated and governed by this specific type of ‘open competition’ law.”).
107. See, e.g., O’Gorman & Young, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 282 U.S. 251, 257
(1931) (“The business of insurance is so far affected with a public interest that the State
may regulate the rates.”).
108. 16B C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 1319 (2007) (citing Reed v. Farmers Ins. Grp., N.E.
2d 1052 (1999)).
109. See cases cited supra notes 101–02.
110. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Comm’r of Ins., 263 N.E.2d 698, 703 (Mass. 1970).
111. See Epstein, supra note 2, at 20–21 (criticizing the Reid Bill because it had no
“single provision that looks to ensuring a minimum [risk-adjusted] rate of return.”); see also
Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 605 (1944) (“Rates which
enable the company to operate successfully, to maintain its financial integrity, to attract
capital, and to compensate its investors for the risks assumed certainly cannot be condemned as
invalid, even though they might produce only a meager return on the so-called ‘fair value’
rate base.” (emphasis added)).
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mit insurers to break even113 do not pass constitutional muster.114 Of
course, neither the government nor anyone else can guarantee that
all insurers will make a profit under a particular regulatory scheme.
Second, courts stress that the government should give insurers
the opportunity to oppose a rate change.115 In other words, courts are
more likely to find government rate regulation constitutional when
the regulatory mechanism includes a safety valve for insurance compa-
nies. In Keystone Insurance Co. v. Foster, the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania rejected a constitutional challenge to a law setting insurance
rates.116 In reaching its decision, the court stressed that the law con-
tained a “constitutional ‘safety valve,’” permitting the insurance com-
missioner to grant rate relief to an insurance company experiencing
“extraordinary circumstances,” thereby avoiding “a confiscatory im-
pact on an insurance company.”117
Similarly, in Calfarm Insurance Co. v. Deukmejian, the California Su-
preme Court considered the constitutionality of an insurance rate-set-
ting statute.118 After severing an unconstitutional provision from the
law, the court held that “the remaining regulatory provisions should
afford insurers an effective means of relief from any confiscatory
rate.”119 One safety valve in Calfarm included statutory language
prohibiting the insurance commissioner from approving or permit-
ting “any rate ‘which is excessive, inadequate, unfairly discriminatory
or otherwise in violation of this chapter’—language which makes it
112. Geeslin v. State Farm Lloyds, 255 S.W.3d 786, 794–95 (Tex. App. 2008) (“We note,
however, that rates can be confiscatory without necessarily leading to insolvency. Thus, the
proof provision set out in [the statute], by allowing for the imposition of confiscatory rates,
fails to provide regulated companies with a constitutionally adequate review of govern-
ment-set rates. We therefore hold that the proof provision is unconstitutional on its face.”).
113. Guar. Nat. Ins. Co. v. Gates, 916 F.2d 508, 515–16 (9th Cir. 1990) (“We agree that
[the statute is unconstitutional because it provides no] mechanism to guarantee a constitu-
tionally required fair and reasonable return . . . . It follows from this definition that if
projected losses and expenses are simply met, the rates are adequate. Thus, [the statute]
guarantees only that an insurer will break even; it does not guarantee the constitutionally
required ‘fair and reasonable return.’”).
114. See cases cited supra notes 112–13. Note the different standards used by the Texas
Court of Appeals (insolvency) and the Ninth Circuit (breaking even). This inconsistency
can be explained by the lack of clear Supreme Court guidance on how to properly define
the constitutionally required rate of return.
115. See U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Curiale, 615 N.Y.S.2d 239, 242 (1994) (holding that
the regulatory authority’s determination establishing a lower rate was arbitrary and capri-
cious because the insurer had no opportunity to oppose this rate reduction).
116. Keystone Ins. Co. v. Foster, 732 F. Supp. 36, 38–39 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
117. Id.
118. Calfarm Ins. Co. v. Deukmejian, 771 P.2d 1247, 1249 (Cal. 1989).
119. Id. at 1251.
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clear that the commissioner can grant relief from confiscatory
rates.”120 A second safety valve allowed aggrieved insurers to apply for
rate relief.121 As discussed in Part I.A., the ACA’s MLR provisions do
contain a safety valve, namely the opportunity for states to request an
adjustment to the federal MLR standards. The question then becomes
whether this particular safety valve sufficiently protects health insurers
nationwide from unreasonable rates.122
Third, an insurance company challenging a rate as confiscatory
bears a heavy burden of proof,123 and courts should generally defer to the
rate setting authority.124 Specifically, a “court cannot usurp the func-
tion of administrative officials . . . or substitute its own judgment for
that of the officials . . . and must give deference to their determina-
tions.”125 Of course, a court must still reject a government rate deter-
mination that involves a violation of constitutional rights.126
Regarding the burden of proof in rate setting cases, a “party challeng-
ing a rate as being confiscatory has the burden of proving that it has
been deprived of the opportunity to earn a fair return and that its failure to
earn a sufficient return is directly attributable to the inaccuracy of the
rate.”127 Therefore, an insurance company opposing the ACA’s MLR
provisions must show that the new minimum MLR (80% in the small
group and individual markets and 85% in the large group market)
eliminates the company’s ability to make a fair profit.
Fourth, the government must consider the actual and predicted fi-
nancial and economic landscape of the marketplace when setting rates,
which is a fact-intensive inquiry.128 As eloquently stated in the Corpus
Juris Secundum encyclopedia of American law:
120. Id. at 1253.
121. Id. at 1251.
122. See infra Part II.C.1 for a discussion of the flaws in the MLR safety valve provision.
123. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Hyde, 275 U.S. 440, 447–48 (1928) (“Jurisdiction of this court to
set aside state-made rates as confiscatory will be exercised only in clear cases; and the bur-
den is on one seeking that relief to bring forward and satisfactorily prove the invalidating
facts.”).
124. 44 C.J.S. Insurance § 120 (2007).
125. Id. (citations omitted).
126. Id.
127. Id. (emphasis added).
128. See 64 AM. JUR. 2D Public Utilities § 133 (2011) (“In determining fair rates, the regu-
latory body considers a representative level of anticipated revenues and expenses and the
property employed by the utility to provide service to its customers. The amount that a
utility is permitted to recover from its customers in the rates it charges is determined by its
revenue requirement . . . . The setting of utility rates requires a certain amount of predic-
tion concerning a utility’s future revenue requirement.” (citations omitted)).
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[W]hat constitutes a reasonable rate of return is primarily a ques-
tion of fact, and there is no immutable standard for its measure-
ment . . . The rate cannot be based merely on policy, but must be
determined from the evidence, and, accordingly, depends largely on
the facts and circumstances of the particular case.129
As discussed in detail below, Congress made no effort to evaluate the
realities of the insurance market when setting the MLR at 80% in the
individual and small groups markets and 85% in the large group mar-
ket.130 It was a purely political decision. This alone renders the ACA’s
MLR provision constitutionally suspect.
In accordance with the preceding guidelines and despite judicial
deference to rate-setting authorities, courts will strike down insurance
regulations when the government goes too far by setting unreasona-
ble, confiscatory rates. In Geeslin v. State Farm Lloyds,131 the Texas
Court of Appeals struck down the proof provision of a rate-setting stat-
ute as unconstitutional on its face.132 The provision in question re-
quired “the commissioner to approve potentially confiscatory rates,
absent clear and convincing evidence that such rates would lead to
insolvency.”133 The court reasoned that “rates can be confiscatory
without necessarily leading to insolvency,” so the provision failed “to
provide regulated companies with a constitutionally adequate review
of government-set rates.”134
The Ninth Circuit reached a similar result in Guaranty National
Insurance Co. v. Gates.135 In Gates, the court interpreted the Nevada
Insurance Code to guarantee “only that an insurer will break even.”136
The Gates court then held the law unconstitutional because a “break
even” provision does not “guarantee the constitutionally required ‘fair
and reasonable return.’”137
In Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Commissioner of Insurance,138 the
Massachusetts Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a
law setting rates in the automobile insurance industry.139 In doing so,
the court flatly rejected the government’s argument that it had unfet-
129. 73B C.J.S. Public Utilities § 76 (2004) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
130. See infra Part II.C.2 for a discussion of Congress’s decision-making process in set-
ting MLR benchmarks.
131. 255 S.W.3d 786 (Tex. App. 2008).
132. Id. at 794–95.
133. Id. at 795.
134. Id.
135. 916 F.2d 508, 515–16 (9th Cir. 1990).
136. Id. at 515.
137. Id.
138. 263 N.E.2d 698 (Mass. 1970).
139. Id. at 699.
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tered discretion to set insurance rates and “if the companies cannot
write the insurance at those rates they are free to stop writing it.”140
Insurers “are not required to either submit to confiscatory rates or go
out of business,” according to the court.141 The court concluded that
the law in question set confiscatory rates and therefore violated the
Constitution.142
Finally, in Calfarm Insurance Co. v. Deukmejian,143 the California
Supreme Court confronted a rate-setting law “which provides that the
commissioner cannot approve a rate increase . . . unless the insurer is
substantially threatened with insolvency.”144 The court held this “in-
solvency only” provision unconstitutional because it did not “afford
insurers an effective means of relief from any confiscatory rate.”145
However, the court saved the rest of the statute by severing the uncon-
stitutional provision.146
The preceding discussion illustrates two important points. First,
courts, including the Supreme Court, have not delineated a clear
boundary between constitutional and confiscatory rates. Second, de-
spite this ambiguity, courts will strike down government set rates when
the government goes too far.
C. Applying Constitutional Principles to the ACA’s MLR Provision
Given the constitutional limitations of government rate regula-
tion in the insurance industry, how will courts view the ACA’s MLR
mandate? This Part argues that the MLR’s safety valve contains funda-
mental flaws, and Congress used an unacceptable process to select the
benchmark MLRs. But while the ACA’s MLR provision could conceiv-
ably fall under a facial constitutional attack, the fact that many insur-
ance companies profit while maintaining MLRs above the ACA’s 80%
or 85% thresholds suggests that a facial challenge will likely fail. On
the other hand, if a particular insurance company can show that the
80% or 85% MLR requirement would force the company to exit the
market or does not permit the company to earn a reasonable, non-
confiscatory rate of return, the company’s as-applied constitutional
challenge would almost certainly succeed.
140. Id. at 703.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. 771 P.2d 1247 (Cal. 1989).
144. Id. at 1251.
145. Id.
146. Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\S\SAN\46-1\SAN104.txt unknown Seq: 25  1-NOV-11 14:53
Summer 2011] MANDATORY MEDICAL LOSS RATIO 163
1. Flaws in the MLR’s Safety Valve
As discussed in Part I.A., the ACA gives HHS discretion to adjust
the MLR benchmark rates in two situations: (1) in the small group
and individual markets of a state, if the Secretary determines that the
80% MLR “may destabilize the individual market in such State,”147
and (2) “if the Secretary determines appropriate on account of the
volatility of the individual market due to the establishment of State
Exchanges.”148 These provisions are “safety valves” because they pro-
vide escape routes from the ACA’s otherwise mandatory 80% or 85%
MLR requirement. But unfortunately, these particular safety valves do
not adequately protect health insurance companies from confiscatory
rates.
First, the ACA’s implementing regulation permits only the states,
not the insurance providers, to request an adjustment to the MLR.149 If a
state does not request an adjustment, the health insurance providers
in the state have no recourse from a confiscatory MLR. This stands in
stark contrast to the safety valves that courts have credited in cases
such as Calfarm Insurance Co. v. Deukmejian and Keystone Insurance Co. v.
Foster, in which the insurance companies, not the states, had the
power to seek relief from unreasonable rates.150
Second, the ACA’s safety valves do not guarantee a non-confisca-
tory rate of return. Specifically, “[i]n order to qualify for this [MLR]
adjustment, a State must demonstrate that requiring insurers in its
individual market to meet the 80 percent MLR has a likelihood of desta-
bilizing the individual market and could result in fewer choices for con-
sumers.”151 In Geeslin v. State Farm Lloyds, the Texas Court of Appeals
held an insurance rate regulation unconstitutional, in part because it
147. ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 10101(f), 124 Stat. 119, 886 (2010) (amending Public
Health Service Act § 2718(b)(1)(A)(ii), codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 300gg-18).
148. Id. at 887 (amending Public Health Service Act § 2718(d), codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. 300gg-18).
149. See Medical Loss Ratio: Getting Your Money’s Worth, HEALTHCARE.GOV (Nov. 22 2010),
http://www.healthcare.gov/news/factsheets/medical_loss_ratio.html [hereinafter Getting
Your Money’s Worth] (“Consistent with NAIC recommendations, the regulation establishes a
process for States to request such an adjustment for up to three years – an effective State-based
transition. In order to qualify for this adjustment, a State must demonstrate that requiring
insurers in its individual market to meet the 80 percent MLR has a likelihood of destabi-
lizing the individual market and could result in fewer choices for consumers.” (emphasis
added)).
150. See Calfarm, 771 P.2d at 1251 (noting that the law allows insurers to seek rate
relief); Keystone Ins. Co. v. Foster, 732 F. Supp. 36, 38 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (noting that the law
permits the commissioner to grant relief to insurance companies).
151. Getting Your Money’s Worth, supra note 149 (emphasis added).
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merely protected companies from insolvency, and “rates can be confis-
catory without necessarily leading to insolvency.”152 Analogously, rates
can be confiscatory without leading to market destabilization. For ex-
ample, consider a market with ten health insurance providers. If the
ACA’s MLR provisions force four of those insurers to exit the market
because they can no longer earn a reasonable rate of return, the rate
is confiscatory. However, the MLR has not necessarily destabilized the
market so long as the remaining six insurers can absorb the four now-
defunct insurers’ prior clients. Thus, the ACA’s MLR adjustment pro-
vision does not afford health insurance companies the constitution-
ally-required level of protection from confiscatory rates.
Third, the ACA’s safety valves apply only to the individual and/or
small group markets, not to the large group market.153 Therefore, in-
surance providers in the large group market lack protection from con-
fiscatory rates. In other words, if a large group insurance provider
cannot raise its MLR above 85%, as required by the ACA, the provider
must either operate at a loss or exit the large group insurance busi-
ness. Forcing an insurance company to make this choice is
unconstitutional.154
Finally, the ACA’s MLR adjustment safety valve is only temporary.
Specifically, “the regulation establishes a process for States to request
such an adjustment for up to three years.”155 After this three-year transi-
tion period, presumably states will no longer be allowed to request an
adjustment to the MLR. Therefore, even if the safety valve is constitu-
tional right now, which is doubtful for the reasons set forth above, it
will certainly become unconstitutional several years down the line.
2. Congress’s Questionable Decision-Making Process
Congress’ true motivation for setting the MLR threshold at 80%
and 85% is suspect. As detailed in Part II.B., the government must
consider the economic and financial realities of the insurance market
152. Geeslin v. State Farm Lloyds, 255 S.W.3d 786, 794–95 (Tex. App. 2008).
153. See ACA § 10101(f), 124 Stat. at 886 (permitting the SHHS to adjust the MLR in
the small group and individual markets if an 80% MLR would destabilize the individual
market) (amending Public Health Service Act § 2718(b)(1)(A)(ii), codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. 300gg-18); id. at 887 (allowing the SHHS to adjust the MLR if the establishment
of health insurance exchanges undesirably increase the volatility in the individual market).
154. See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Comm’r of Ins., 263 N.E.2d 698, 701–04 (Mass. 1970)
(“[The government] may not constitutionally fix rates which are so low that if the insurers
engage in business they may do so only at a loss. The insurers are not required to either submit
to confiscatory rates or go out of business.” (emphasis added)).
155. Getting Your Money’s Worth, supra note 149 (emphasis added).
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when setting rates. “The rate cannot be based merely on policy, [but in-
stead, it] must be determined from the evidence like any other
fact.”156 Thus, the rate “depends largely on the facts and circumstances of
the particular case.”157
On December 13, 2009, several months before the enactment of
the ACA and during the heat of the healthcare reform debate, the
Congressional Budget Office (“CBO”) released a memo discussing the
ACA’s MLR proposal.158 The memo stated that if Congress set MLRs
higher than 80% for the individual and small-group markets or 85%
for the large-group market, the CBO would record transactions in
those markets as “cash flows in the federal budget.”159 According to
Megan McArdle, business and economics editor of The Atlantic,
“[n]eedless to say, it is very doubtful that Congress wishes to consoli-
date the operations of the nation’s health insurers on the financial
statements of the United States government.”160 In other words, Con-
gress does not want to add fuel to the already-contentious yearly
budget debates by including private health insurance company bal-
ance sheets on the government books.
Not surprisingly, Congress latched on to the 80% and 85% MLR
numbers from the CBO memo, passing a bill with the highest possible
MLRs that do not trigger CBO’s threat. In fact, the language and
structure of the ACA itself suggest that Congress harbored doubts
about the appropriate MLR until the very last minute. Section 1001 of
the ACA would have set the MLR thresholds at 75% in the individual
market and 80% in the group market, a less stringent requirement
than the ultimately enacted 80% and 85% regime.161 However, sec-
tion 10101(f) of the ACA amended the just-added section 1001 to
raise the MLR requirements to 80% in the small group and individual
markets and 85% in the large group market.162
156. Pittsburg v. Pa. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 69 A.2d 844, 850 (1949) (emphasis added).
157. 73B C.J.S. Public Utilities § 76 (2004) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
158. Budgetary Treatment of Proposals to Regulate Medical Loss Ratios, CONG. BUDGET OF-
FICE, (Dec. 13, 2009), https://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/107xx/doc10731/MLR_and_budget-
ary_treatment.pdf [hereinafter Budgetary Treatment].
159. Id.
160. Megan McArdle, The CBO Warns on Too-High Medical Loss Ratio Requirements, THE
ATLANTIC (Dec. 15, 2009), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2009/12/the-
cbo-warns-on-too-high-medical-loss-ratio-requirements/31863/.
161. ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1001, 124 Stat. 119, 137 (2010) (amending the Public
Health Service Act to add in part § 2718(b)(1)(A)–(B), codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
300gg-18).
162. Id. § 10101(f), 124 Stat. at 885 (amending Public Health Service Act
§ 2718(b)(1)(A), codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 300gg-18).
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Congress’ decision to set the MLR at 80% and 85% was not based
on economic analysis of the insurance market, balancing the interests
of insurance companies and consumers, or what MLR will yield a rea-
sonable, non-confiscatory rate of return for the insurance industry,
but politics. This cannot be stressed enough. Congress did not want the
health insurance industry’s financials on government books, and it set
the MLR accordingly. This decision-making process falls far short of
the fact-intensive, market-specific, economic-based analysis required
by the Constitution when the government sets rates.
3. The Fate of a Constitutional Challenge to the MLR
In spite of all of the defects in the ACA’s MLR provision, it might
withstand a facial constitutional challenge because some insurance
companies can, and do, make a reasonable profit while maintaining
MLRs within the range required by the statute. In other words, some
will argue that as applied to the insurance industry as a whole, the
ACA’s MLR provisions do not impose confiscatory rates.
To succeed on a facial challenge, the petitioner must show that
the legislation under attack is unconstitutional in all circumstances.163
Accordingly, an insurance company facially challenging the ACA’s
MLR requirement would probably have to show that no insurance com-
pany could earn a reasonable profit while maintaining an MLR of at
least 80% in the small group and individual markets and 85% in the
large group market. However, many insurance companies already op-
erate profitably at or above the newly-mandated MLRs. For instance,
on April 15, 2010, the U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science,
and Transportation reported that, in 2009, the largest health insur-
ance providers displayed MLR ratios ranging from 68.1% to 88.1% in
the individual market, 78.2% to 92.1% in the small group market, and
83.3% to 88.2% in the large group market.164 A recent article also
mentions that most of Kansas’s top health insurers already meet the
MLR requirement.165 Because some health insurance companies can
163. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987) (“A facial challenge to a
legislative Act is, of course, the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the
challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be
valid.”).
164. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCI., & TRANSP., 111TH CONG., IMPLEMENT-
ING HEALTH INSURANCE REFORM: NEW MEDICAL LOSS RATIO INFORMATION FOR POLICYMAKERS
AND CONSUMERS 3 tbl.I (2010), available at http://commerce.senate.gov/public/?a=Files.
Serve&File_id=be0fd052-4ca6-4c12-9fb1-a5e4a09c0667.
165. Dave Ranney, State’s Top Health Insurers Meet Medical-Loss Ratio Requirement, KAN.
HEALTH INST. (Mar. 4, 2011), http://www.khi.org/news/2011/mar/04/most-insurers-
meet-medical-loss-ratio-requirement/.
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make money under the ACA’s 80% and 85% MLR regime, a court
would probably reject a facial challenge to the Act’s MLR provisions.
However, if an individual insurance company demonstrates that
the federal MLR requirement would either force the company to exit
the market or prevent the company from earning a reasonable profit,
the company’s as-applied constitutional challenge would likely prevail.
In analyzing the issue, a court would certainly consider the limitations
of the MLR safety valve provisions and the suspicious manner in which
Congress chose the 80% and 85% MLR thresholds as factors cutting
against the constitutionality of the Act. In fact, a court may believe
that the ACA’s MLR safety valve provisions cannot adequately protect
any health insurance company from the threat of confiscatory rates,
even if some companies can make a profit under the ACA’s MLR re-
quirements. Because of Congress’ questionable motives for setting the
specific MLR benchmarks, such a court would likely follow the Texas
Court of Appeals’ analysis in Geeslin v. State Farm Lloyds and hold the
ACA’s MLR provision unconstitutional on its face for failing to suffi-
ciently protect the industry against unreasonable rates.166
Some might argue that states have been imposing MLR require-
ments on insurance companies for years, so why cannot the federal
government do the same? First, while it is true that the federal govern-
ment does not necessarily violate the Constitution by setting a mini-
mum MLR in the health insurance industry, the ACA’s particular
MLR provision presents constitutional problems for all the reasons
discussed above.167 Second, a governmental entity that sets confisca-
tory rates violates the Constitution, regardless of whether the rate-set-
ting entity is federal or state. The Supreme Court has never
immunized the federal government in the rate setting context. As de-
tailed above, courts will not hesitate to strike down insurance rate laws
that fail to guarantee insurers the opportunity to earn a fair profit.
Finally, until now, each state has determined its own MLR by ex-
amining the realities of the insurance market in the state. Specifically,
“[s]tate-imposed medical loss ratio requirements have varied widely.
They reflect differences in rural and urban markets as well as in mar-
166. See Geeslin v. State Farm Lloyds, 255 S.W.3d 786, 794–95 (Tex. App. 2008) (“We
note, however, that rates can be confiscatory without necessarily leading to insolvency.
Thus, the proof provision set out in [the statute], by allowing for the imposition of confis-
catory rates, fails to provide regulated companies with a constitutionally adequate review of
government-set rates. We therefore hold that the proof provision is unconstitutional on its
face.”).
167. See supra Part II.C.1–2.
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kets that have different levels of competition.”168 In other words, each
state bases its MLR requirement on the actual circumstances prevail-
ing in the state’s insurance market. This is the constitutionally-proper
method for setting insurance rates. In contrast, the federal govern-
ment set the ACA’s MLR requirement based on political calculations,
not by analyzing the economic realities of the insurance markets
around the country. This “one size fits all approach” creates a consti-
tutional concern.
III. Mandatory MLR in the Health Insurance Industry: Bad
Policy?
A. Policy Arguments Favoring a Mandatory MLR
Notwithstanding the constitutional problems of the ACA’s MLR
provision, Congress had valid reasons to believe that setting a
mandatory, nationwide MLR for the health insurance industry made
good sense. The ACA’s statutory language indicates that Congress
tried to accomplish several competing policy goals through the mini-
mum MLR requirement: participation by insurance providers, compe-
tition among insurance providers, and value for health insurance
consumers.169 Of these three goals, ensuring that consumers get
“value for their premium dollar” reigned supreme during the health-
care debate.170 Specifically, ACA supporters in Congress claimed that
the MLR requirement would reduce insurance companies’ adminis-
trative costs and stop executives from getting rich at the expense of
the American consumer. Legislators advocating for the ACA uttered
this mantra over and over, using slightly different words to convey the
same basic concept: insurance companies are greedy and wasteful,
and the MLR requirement will rein them in. The following quotations
are exemplary of the debate:
168. Haberkorn, supra note 46.
169. ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 10101(f), 124 Stat. 119, 887 (2010) (discussing the
factors states should consider when deciding whether to raise the MLR above federally
mandated levels) (amending Public Health Service Act § 2718(b)(2), codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. 300gg-18).
170. See 157 CONG. REC. H266 (daily ed. Jan. 19, 2011) (statement of Rep. Rush D.
Holt) (claiming that the ACA will secure adequate health care service to almost all Ameri-
cans because it requires health insurance companies to “spend . . . premium dollars on
actually providing health care”); 157 CONG. REC. H267 (daily ed. Jan. 19, 2011) (statement
of Rep. John F. Tierney) (noting that, due to lack of regulation, insurance companies went
from spending 95% of all premium dollars in health services in 1993 to 60% in 2008, and
arguing that the MLR will reverse this trend by requiring insurance companies to invest
premium dollars in actual health services).
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This provision provides the Commissioner with the authority to en-
sure that premiums are used primarily to provide health benefits
and not lost to excessive administrative costs or profit.
—Report on the Committee on the
Budget, House of Representatives171
Without a minimum medical loss ratio to hold insurance compa-
nies accountable there is no limit on the amount of taxpayer re-
sources that private health insurance companies can spend on
executive compensation, shareholder profits, marketing, and other
activities that do not add value for the consumer.
—Representative John D. Rockefeller,
IV172
What a novel idea; you get some bang for your buck and the gov-
ernment would actually do something for you for a change, pro-
tecting consumer rights and making sure that companies do what
they should be doing.
This isn’t about profits. The companies are extremely profita-
ble, and this is not going to cramp their style. In fact, this is about
greed.
—Representative John Tierney173
[The bill] will require all insurers to reinvest more of our premi-
ums back into health coverage through a “medical loss ratio” of at
least 80 percent, ensuring that no more than 20 percent of our
premiums go toward administrative expenses and windfall profits for
insurance executives.
—Representative James R. Langevin174
This is going to make health insurance companies put at least 85
percent of their premiums toward actual health services, not ad-
ministrative costs, marketing campaigns or profits or bloated CEO
salaries. Advocates have been trying to get these profit restrictions
in place in many States, but it is usually too hard to fight these
companies on a local level. So while I am disappointed we don’t
have the public option, the minimum medical loss ratio is a potent
measure that will limit insurers’ profits and put the brakes on
skyrocketing premiums.
—Senator Al Franken175
171. H.R. REP. NO. 111-443, vol. I, at 214 (2010), reprinted in 2010 U.S.C.C.A.N. 127,
138.
172. S. REP. NO. 111-89, at 434 (2009) (views of Rep. John D. Rockefeller IV et al.).
173. 157 CONG. REC. H1261 (daily ed. Feb. 18, 2011) (statement of Rep. John Tierney)
(emphasis added).
174. 156 CONG. REC. H2432 (daily ed. Mar. 25, 2010) (statement of Rep. James R.
Langevin) (emphasis added).
175. 155 CONG. REC. S13817 (daily ed. Dec. 23, 2009) (statement of Sen. Al Franken)
(emphasis added).
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These worries have some factual basis. As mentioned above,
health insurance premiums continue to rise much too quickly, e.g., by
20% or more from 2010 to 2011.176 On the other hand, health insur-
ance companies typically operate on a relatively low profit margin.
The health insurance industry profit margin is 2.2%, which pales in
comparison to the profit margins in other health-related industries
such as pharmaceuticals (19.3%) and medical products (16.3%).177
Additionally, a similar study shows that health insurance companies’
profit margins vary quite a bit across the industry, from a high of 7.3%
for WellPoint to a low of -0.3% for Health Net.178
Imposing a profit cap on a low-profit margin, heterogeneous in-
dustry does not make much economic sense. If the health insurance
industry suffers from anti-competitive tendencies, then increasing
competition will solve the problem. In that regard, the ACA’s health
insurance exchanges should enhance competition in the health insur-
ance marketplace. With greater competition, the MLR requirement
becomes redundant at best and harmful at worst, for all the reasons
set forth in Part III.B. below.
B. Policy Arguments Against a Mandatory MLR
As discussed in Part I.A., the ACA’s MLR requirement acts to cap
profits in the health insurance industry. Economists have long con-
demned profit caps and other government price controls because
they reduce quality and distort the allocation of resources.179 Oppo-
nents of the MLR requirement have adapted and expanded these gen-
eral “anti-price control” arguments to the MLR context.
Some critics believe that requiring insurance companies to meet
a high MLR standard will drive many insurers out of the market,
thereby reducing competition and consumer choice.180 Different re-
gions have different demographics, costs of living, average salaries,
and so forth, so the administrative costs to run a health insurance bus-
176. Pear, supra note 96.
177. Fortune 500, Top Industries: Most Profitable, CNNMONEY (May 4, 2009), http://
money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune500/2009/performers/industries/profits/.
178. Fortune 500, Industries, CNNMONEY.COM (May 3, 2010), http://money.cnn.com/
magazines/fortune/fortune500/2010/industries/223/index.html.
179. Rockoff, supra note 100, at 409–10.
180. See, e.g., Haberkorn, supra note 46 (“If the medical loss ratios are overly stringent,
companies and many state commissioners are concerned that insurers will leave markets
with too few enrollees to make it worthwhile, leaving consumers with few coverage options.
They also fear that small insurers will be driven out of business because the requirements
don’t account for market volatility from one year to the next.”).
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iness will inevitably vary throughout the country. Some insurance
providers in high administrative cost markets may not meet the 80%
or 85% MLR requirement and will have to exit the markets, or so the
argument goes. According to Congressman John Carter (R-Texas),
“[i]ndustry analysis estimates that as many as 47 percent of the partici-
pants in individual and small group plans which have higher adminis-
trative costs due to economies of scale will lose their health insurance
if [the MLR] regulation becomes law.”181 Similarly, the CBO worries
that the health insurance industry’s response to the minimum MLR
law “would reduce the types, range of prices, and number of private-
sector sellers of health insurance.”182
These concerns apply with particular force to small insurance
companies because the MLR requirement hits these small businesses
especially hard. Although the ACA’s MLR provision differentiates be-
tween the sizes of the group insured (80% MLR for small groups and
individuals and 85% MLR for large groups), the law does not distin-
guish between large and small insurance providers. This is problem-
atic because small companies typically have higher administrative
costs (on a percentage basis) than larger companies do.183 As Merrill
Matthews of the Institute for Policy Innovation puts it, “[t]he MLR is
nothing but a price control mechanism that will drive even more of
the smaller and medium-sized insurers out of the market, dramatically
reducing competition. That’s in part because large insurers have bet-
ter economies of scale to keep administrative costs lower.”184 If the
MLR requirement puts small insurers out of business, large insurance
companies will face less competition and, therefore less pressure to
keep prices down.
The MLR requirement has real potential to cause insurance com-
panies to exit certain markets. In Maine, one low cost insurer that
covers over 30% of the people in Maine’s individual insurance market
“said it may exit the market if required to meet this higher [MLR]
standard in 2011 and 2012.”185 Similarly, Nevada claimed that three
insurers “have imposed moratoriums on new business while they de-
181. 157 CONG. REC. H1651 (daily ed. Mar. 9, 2011) (statement of Rep. John Carter).
182. See Budgetary Treatment, supra note 158.
183. See Merrill Matthews, Rolling Back ObamaCare: Eliminate the Medical Loss Ratio,
FORBES BLOGS (Jan. 18, 2011, 12:42 AM), http://blogs.forbes.com/merrillmatthews/2011/
01/18/rolling-back-obamacare-eliminate-the-medical-loss-ratio/.
184. Id.
185. The Maine MLR Adjustment, supra note 67.
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termine their ultimate market strategy” and might leave the Nevada
market if HHS fails to grant the state’s MLR adjustment request.186
A second argument against the ACA’s MLR provision focuses on
the law’s likely detrimental effect on insurance brokers. If insurance
companies must reduce administrative costs to comply with the
heightened MLR requirement, then insurers have a strong incentive
to cut broker commissions. This is one reason why brokers lobbied to
keep their commissions out of the MLR calculation.187 If insurers cut
payments to brokers, some brokers will go out of business entirely,
and others will simply stop selling health insurance. If this happens,
then the health insurance market, and in particular the consumers,
will lose the benefits that brokers bring to the table (insurance plan
design, implementation, explanation, troubleshooting, and claim res-
olution).188 Congressman Tom Price of Georgia expressed this very
concern: The MLR requirement “compromise[s] the opportunity for
brokers to provide the best advice to citizens . . . . [T]hese folks are
going to be pinched and pushed out of their jobs, the ones that are
actually helping our citizens to weave their way through the morass of
health coverage in this country.”189
Third, an MLR requirement paternalistically deprives consumers
of the freedom to choose the kind of health plan they want. Some
insurance companies have high MLRs, and some have low MLRs.190
Assuming that low MLR plans spend more on plan administration,
and higher administrative costs result in better customer support,
claims processing, client service, and so forth, some rational consum-
ers may prefer low MLR plans. The ACA’s MLR requirement effec-
tively eliminates these kinds of plans.
The fact that insurance companies operate over a wide range of
MLRs supports the proposition that consumers have heterogeneous
preferences when it comes to the MLR, or at least the variables that
constitute the MLR. In 2005, the six largest for-profit insurance com-
186. Letter from Brett J. Barratt, Nev. Comm’r Ins., to Kathleen Sebelius, Sec’y, Dep’t
of Health & Human Servs., at. 3 (Feb. 9, 2011) (citations omitted), http://cciio.cms.gov/
programs/marketreforms/mlr/states/nevada/mlr_letter_to_sec_sebelius_2_9_11.pdf.
187. See Haberkorn, supra note 46  (“Insurance agents and brokers wanted their com-
missions to be excluded from medical loss ratio calculations because of concern that insur-
ers would cut their pay to improve medical loss ratios.”).
188. See CONWELL, supra note 47, at 3 (explaining the benefits that insurance brokers
bring to employers and insurance plans).
189. 157 CONG. REC. H1261 (daily ed. Feb. 18, 2011) (statement of Rep. Tom Price).
190. See supra note 164 and accompanying text (indicating that in 2009 MLR ratios
ranged from 68.1% to 88.1% in the individual market, from 78.2% to 92.1% in the small
group market, and from 88.2% to 87.2% in the large group market).
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panies had MLRs ranging from 76.9% (Aetna) to 83.9% (Health
Net).191 In 2010, the five top health insurance companies in Kansas
had the following MLRs: American Medical Security, 97%; Blue Cross
Blue Shield of Kansas, 93%; Blue Cross Blue Shield of Kansas City,
91%; Coventry, 72%; and Time Insurance Company, 57%.192 This
kind of variety is good, but the ACA obviously considers it to be a
problem.
On a more basic level, not all low MLR plans are “bad” and not all
high MLR plans are “good.”193 For instance, Aetna remained popular
in 2005 despite its relatively low MLR.194 Some consumers are obvi-
ously willing to pay a higher price for higher quality. The ACA should
not discourage that.
Fourth, this new federal MLR regime will be extremely compli-
cated and expensive to administer. The implementing regulations are
seventy-two pages long and contain elaborate guidelines.195 Despite
the length and detail of these regulations, insurance providers will still
have difficulty determining exactly what expenses to include where in
the MLR calculation because the definition of its components is inher-
ently vague. For example, a non-claim expense must be “designed to
improve health quality,” and “to increase the likelihood of desired
health outcomes in ways that are capable of being objectively mea-
sured and of producing verifiable results and achievements,” for a
health insurance issuer to count this expense as a quality improve-
ment activity within the MLR calculation.196 Similarly, activities that
“[e]nhance the use of health care data to improve quality, trans-
parency, and outcomes and support meaningful use of health infor-
mation technology” are considered to improve health care quality and
used in the calculation of the MLR, whereas those that are “designed
primarily to control or contain costs” are excluded from this defini-
tion.197 These regulations fail to define with precision important com-
191. Jonathan G. Bethely, Health Plans Make More, Spend Less in 2005, AMERICAN MEDI-
CAL NEWS, Mar. 6, 2006, at 30, available at http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2006/03/
06/bisd0306.htm.
192. Ranney, supra note 165.
193. See generally discussion infra Part III.C.
194. Cf. Bethely, supra note 191, at 30 tbl.1 (showing that in 2005, Aetna’s revenue
increased 13% from the previous year, despite having a 76.9% MLR, the lowest in the
industry for that year).
195. See MLR Regulations, supra note 35, 75 Fed. Reg. 74,864 (Dec. 1, 2010) (to be
codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 158), available at http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2010/pdf/2010-
29596.pdf.
196. Id. at 74,875.
197. Id. at 74,924.
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ponents of the MLR ratio, such as quality improvement activity.
Businesses need clear guidance to plan their affairs, and the MLR reg-
ulations do not deliver.
This complexity and ambiguity will cause several problems. First,
health insurance companies will spend much time, energy, money,
and human capital trying to understand and comply with the nuanced
regulations. Insurers would better spend these resources on some-
thing else, e.g., covering the costs of a patient’s surgery. Additionally,
overly complex and/or vague laws such as the ACA’s MLR provision
are ripe for abuse. Opportunistic insurance providers will seek out
ways to circumvent the law by artificially inflating their MLRs or find-
ing “loopholes” in the regulatory scheme. Thus, the MLR require-
ment will likely be less effective than its supporters hope.
Finally, the ACA’s MLR provisions will arguably discourage health
insurance companies from investing in innovation. Innovating is ex-
pensive. If a company spends money to develop technology that
counts as “administrative,” such as an improved billing system or bet-
ter claims processing software, the company will have a harder time
meeting the MLR requirement. Thus, the company will be less enthu-
siastic about developing the new technology in the first place. Addi-
tionally, since the MLR provisions cap a company’s profits, the
company has little incentive to go above-and-beyond what is necessary
to meet the MLR. Merrill Matthews explores this reasoning through a
hypothetical:
Suppose a new preventive care therapy emerges that makes pa-
tients very healthy. Where is the economic incentive for insurers to
adopt that therapy if they will be penalized for claims dropping
below the MLR?
Suppose new software becomes available that would lower an
insurer’s claims by catching fraud. But buying the software adds to
its limited admin allowance, while reducing fraud lowers the in-
surer’s claims costs. Either way, it could be forced to pay the rebate
penalty.198
At this point, one should realize the difficulty in classifying the
MLR law as normatively good or bad policy. As with most tough issues,
both sides of the debate make persuasive arguments that cut in oppo-
site directions. The next Part addresses the effect of a phenomenon
called “anchoring,” another policy concern that may tip the scales
against the ACA’s MLR provision.
198. Matthews, supra note 183.
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C. Anchored to the MLR
Psychologists use the generic term “cognitive bias” to describe
“any of a wide range of observer effects identified in cognitive science
and social psychology including very basic statistical, social attribution,
and memory errors that are common to all human beings.”199 In lay-
man’s terms, cognitive biases are mental errors that influence our be-
liefs and decisions, potentially to our detriment. Anchoring is one
kind of cognitive bias.200
Anchoring describes “the common human tendency to rely too
heavily, or ‘anchor,’ on one trait or piece of information when mak-
ing decisions.”201 In practice, the anchoring theory posits that “differ-
ent starting points yield different estimates [end points], which are
biased toward the initial values.”202 The following example illustrates
the anchoring phenomenon. Suppose Seller X decides to sell his
house. He lists it for $500,000 and waits for offers. Buyer Y likes the
house and begins negotiating the price with Seller X. Because Seller X
set the price at $500,000, the negotiations revolve around that num-
ber. In other words, $500,000 acts as an anchor in the parties’ minds
during the negotiation. After several rounds of offers and counter-
offers, the parties settle on $480,000.
Now suppose Seller X had initially listed the same house for
$600,000. Buyer Y still likes the house, but believes the price is way too
high. Nonetheless, Buyer Y enters into negotiations with Seller X, hop-
ing to drive the price down. $600,000 acts as the new anchor point,
and the parties negotiate around that number. The parties finally
agree on a price of $520,000. The higher starting point ($600,000,
instead of $500,000) results in a higher end point ($520,000, instead
of $480,000) due to anchoring. This powerful cognitive bias influ-
ences real-world negotiations203 and pricing strategies.204
199. Cognitive Bias, SCIENCEDAILY, http://www.sciencedaily.com/articles/c/cognitive_
bias.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2011).
200. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases, 185 SCI. 1124, 1128, 1230 (1974) (describing three different types of cognitive bi-
ases, including anchoring).
201. Anchoring Bias in Decision-Making, SCIENCEDAILY, http://www.sciencedaily.com/ar-
ticles/a/anchoring.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2011).
202. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 200, at 1128.
203. See Charles B. Craver, Aspirations, Anchoring, and Negotiation Results, NEGOTIATOR
MAGAZINE (Oct. 2005), http://negotiatormagazine.com/article291_1.html (discussing the
effects of anchoring on negotiations).
204. See Roger Dooley, Anchor Pricing Strategies, NEUROMARKETING (July 18, 2008), http:/
/www.neurosciencemarketing.com/blog/articles/anchor-prices.htm (discussing how mar-
keters can take advantage of irrational anchoring).
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The ACA’s new nationwide mandatory MLR will act as an anchor
to which health insurance companies will gravitate. Importantly, this
anchoring will affect all kinds of insurance providers, both good and bad,
and consumers will ultimately lose. For ease of explanation, this Part
labels companies having a high MLR (above 80% or 85%) as “good”
and companies having a low MLR (below 80% or 85%) as “bad.” In
other words, good companies are those that currently exceed the new
MLR requirements, and bad companies are those that do not. While
this assumption is incorrect for the reasons discussed in Part IV.B., the
ACA relies upon it, and so shall this Part when discussing the MLR’s
anchoring effect.
The ACA introduced new, highly visible anchors into the collec-
tive mind of the health insurance industry: an 80% MLR in the indi-
vidual and small group markets and an 85% MLR in the large group
market. How will insurance companies respond? A bad company can
respond in one of two ways. First, it could leave the market, deciding
that changing its business to comply with the new MLR does not make
economic sense. This may be positive for consumers (if the company
is indeed bad) or negative for consumers (because it reduces con-
sumer choice). Alternatively, the bad company might change its busi-
ness practices to comply with the new MLR. Again, this may be
positive for consumers (if the company raises its MLR by providing
more value and eliminating wasteful expenses), but it may be negative
(if the company cuts back on expenses for services that consumers
actually want). In any event, the ACA’s MLR provisions were clearly
designed with the bad companies in mind.
That leaves the good companies. How will the new MLR require-
ment affect them? Anchoring will cause good providers with high
MLRs to drift down towards the anchor point (80% or 85%). For ex-
ample, suppose Insurance Company Z currently operates at an MLR
of 90% and sells only to large groups. In dealing with the new federal
MLR regulations and reporting requirements, Company Z becomes
acutely aware of the mandatory 85% MLR in the large group market.
Consequently, the company changes its business practices (reimburse-
ment rates, salaries, administrative expenses, etc.) either consciously,
to increase profits, or subconsciously, because 85% is the new magic
number. Over time, Company Z’s 90% MLR becomes 88%, or 86%, or
85%, because the federal law requires this percentage.
This particular anchoring phenomenon would not pose much of
a problem in an insurance industry filled with bad companies. In
other words, without good companies in the current market, down-
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ward anchoring becomes irrelevant. But the individual, small group,
and large group markets include both bad companies (68% MLR,
78% MLR, and 83% MLR, respectively) and good companies (88%
MLR, 84% MLR, and 88% MLR, respectively).205 And since the health
insurance industry is heterogeneous, filled with both good and bad
companies, downward anchoring poses a real danger to consumers.
Nothing indicates that Congress considered this potentially nega-
tive consequence when passing the ACA. Congress likely recognized
that different insurance companies had different MLRs, some higher
than others.206 However, as recounted in Part III.A., ACA supporters
focused the MLR debate on bad companies and ignored the impact
on good companies. Put differently, Congress hoped that a minimum
MLR would transform an industry comprising good and bad compa-
nies into one containing only good companies (or at least some good
companies and some “average” companies). In reality, the MLR man-
date may homogenize the health insurance industry as companies
anchor themselves to the new MLR. Average insurance providers will
glut the market, replacing both good and bad companies. Norma-
tively, one can question whether this market homogenization benefits
consumers. Descriptively, anchoring suggests that it will occur.
Critics of this approach may point out that if anchoring to the
MLR really exists, insurance companies should have anchored to the
existing state-based MLR benchmarks. Yet, many states already have
MLR requirements, but the health insurance industry remains hetero-
geneous and contains both good and bad companies. This challenge
has some appeal but ultimately fails. Unlike the ACA’s unitary nation-
wide MLR, state MLR requirements vary widely from state-to-state. For
example, “North Dakota requires a 55 percent medical loss ratio for
insurers in the individual market, and New Jersey requires an 80 per-
cent ratio.”207 These divergent requirements do not provide a fixed,
stable anchor to tether the insurance industry’s thinking. The anchor-
ing effect of multiple, conflicting state regulations is lower than that
of the ACA’s single, nationwide MLR requirement. Additionally, state
insurance regulations are based on the prevailing market conditions
in the state. Therefore, when compared to a federal statute like the
ACA, state-mandated MLRs are much more likely to change from
205. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
206. See 155 CONG. REC. S13626–27 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 2009) (statement of Sen. Bill
Nelson) (discussing the MLRs of different health insurance providers).
207. Haberkorn, supra note 46.
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year-to-year. This uncertainty and instability lessens the anchoring ef-
fect of state MLR requirements vis-a`-vis the federal MLR provisions.
Congress itself implicitly expressed concern with anchoring in
the ACA, albeit in a different context. Specifically, the government
included a “maintenance of effort” (“MOE”) requirement in the
ACA’s Medicaid/CHIP provision. This suggests that Congress worries
about anchoring or, more concretely, regression to new federal gov-
ernment healthcare mandates.
Under the ACA, states must maintain Medicaid and CHIP eligibil-
ity levels for children above 133% of the federal poverty level
(“FPL”).208 The Georgetown University Center for Children and Fami-
lies describes the MOE requirement as follows:
Today, nearly all states provide Medicaid and/or CHIP cover-
age to children up to 200 percent of the FPL [federal poverty
level], with 25 states covering children at or above 250 percent of
the FPL. As a condition of receiving federal Medicaid funding,
states cannot scale back their income eligibility levels and enrollment proce-
dures in place on March 23, 2010 for children eligible for Medicaid
and CHIP.209
In other words, there are currently good states (those that cover
children up to a high percentage of the FPL) and bad states (those
that cover children only to a low percentage of the FPL), just like
there are good insurance companies and bad insurance companies in
the MLR context. The MOE requirement prevents the good states
from scaling-back their coverage levels to the new ACA-mandated
level (133% of FPL). This means that the MOE protects against
anchoring by requiring the good states to stay good. If Congress was
not concerned about regression or backsliding by good states, Con-
gress would have no reason to insert the MOE provision in the ACA.
Obviously, Congress is concerned that the ACA’s new requirements
will anchor even good actors. However, Congress did not include an
anti-anchoring MOE provision in the MLR section of the law. The
ACA does not prevent good insurance providers from backsliding, so
the new MLR requirements may not work as well as ACA supporters
hope.
IV. Implementing the MLR
The ACA’s MLR requirement may be unconstitutional and un-
wise, but it is the law. This Part provides recommendations to insur-
208. Summary, supra note 8, at 3.
209. Id. (emphasis added).
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ance companies, state governments, and the federal government on
how to best implement the MLR requirement.
A. Insurance Companies
The ACA changes the way insurance providers must calculate and
report their MLRs.210 Companies will not be comfortable with the new
requirements right away; it will take some time. To shorten the learn-
ing curve, a company should designate certain employees as “MLR
experts” and task those individuals to learn the new law inside-and-
out. As discussed above,211 many states imposed MLR requirements
on health insurance companies long before the ACA. If a company
already has an established MLR compliance department, then it
should draw the MLR experts from this department. These individuals
have experience dealing with MLR issues in general, so they will be
best suited to navigate through the new federal regulations. Addition-
ally, large insurance companies may hire outside counsel or a health
care consultant to work on MLR-related issues that are too complex or
controversial to handle internally.
Second, management will need to decide whether to adjust the
company’s business practices in response to the MLR requirements,
and if so, how. In low MLR companies, managers will have some
tough choices to make. According to the CBO:
Insurers operating at MLRs below such a minimum would have a
limited number of possible responses. They could change the way
they provide health insurance, perhaps by reducing their profits or
cutting back on efforts to restrain benefit costs through care man-
agement. They could choose to pay the rebates, but if they raised
premiums to cover the added costs they would simply have to re-
bate that increment to premiums later. Alternatively, they could
exit the market entirely.212
Managers of high MLR companies should consider what changes they
can make to improve their businesses while still keeping their MLRs
above the 80% or 85% threshold.
Third, low MLR companies facing a tough transition may try lob-
bying their respective states to seek an MLR adjustment from HHS.
The ACA’s implementing regulation permits only the states, not the
210. See generally MLR Regulations, supra note 35, 75 Fed. Reg. 74,864 (Dec. 1, 2010)
(to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 158), available at http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2010/pdf/
2010-29596.pdf (implementing MLR requirements for health insurance providers pursu-
ant to the ACA).
211. See supra Part III.C.
212. Budgetary Treatment, supra note 158.
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insurance providers, to request an adjustment to the MLR.213 There-
fore, insurance companies need the states’ help to get relief. This
strategy worked in Maine. MEGA, a large insurance provider in the
state, warned that it might leave Maine’s individual health insurance
market if forced to meet the ACA’s strict MLR requirement.214 Maine
subsequently petitioned HHS for an MLR adjustment, and HHS
granted the request.215
B. State Governments
State governments have several important decisions to make
when it comes to the federal MLR. First, a state must decide whether
to request an MLR adjustment from HHS.216 In deciding whether to
seek an adjustment, a state should evaluate and weigh the interests of
all the parties affected by the new MLR law, including insurers, bro-
kers, and consumers. The state should publicly solicit comments from
all interested parties to obtain the information necessary to appropri-
ately balance the interests involved. Of course, the state should be
wary that self-interested parties may make groundless claims in order
to influence the state to pursue a course of action that favors the party
but hurts the state as a whole. If, after balancing the interests, the state
determines that raising the minimum MLR will do more harm than
good (“destabilize the market”), then the state should petition HHS
for an MLR adjustment.
Second, a state must determine whether to increase the state’s
minimum MLR above the federally mandated level. The ACA gives
each state the option to raise its own minimum MLR requirements
above the federal benchmarks.217 Congress directs the states to “seek
to ensure adequate participation by health insurance issuers, competi-
tion in the health insurance market in the State, and value for con-
sumers so that premiums are used for clinical services and quality
improvements” when determining the appropriate MLR.218 In other
213. See supra note 155 and accompanying text (indicating that the ACA provides states
with up to three years to request a MLR adjustment).
214. The Maine MLR Adjustment, supra note 67.
215. See supra note 29 and accompanying text (indicating that Maine’s MLR adjust-
ment request was granted on March 8, 2011).
216. See supra note 28 and accompanying text (indicating that as of September 12,
2011, sixteen states have requested MLR adjustments).
217. ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 10101(f), 124 Stat. 119, 886 (2010) (amending Public
Health Service Act § 2718(b)(1)(A), codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 300gg-18).
218. Id. (amending Public Health Service Act § 2718(b)(2), codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. 300gg-18).
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words, a state should consider the health insurance marketplace in its
entirety when setting an MLR. As with the MLR adjustment decision,
the state should gather as much information as possible, balance the
interests involved, and choose the best course of action for the state as
a whole.
C. The Federal Government
The federal government can, and should, do several things with
respect to the MLR. First, the government should act quickly on state
petitions for MLR adjustments. So far, HHS’s performance on this
front leaves much to be desired. Of the seventeen requests for MLR
adjustments, ten remained pending as of September 12, 2011.219 HHS
received Nevada’s request on February 9, 2011, and more than two
months later, the application was still undergoing review for com-
pleteness.220 The longer HHS takes to decide these MLR adjustment
petitions, the more likely it becomes that insurance companies will
leave the market. This market destabilization will hurt health insur-
ance consumers. Substantively, HHS should generally defer to a state’s
determination that the new federal MLR standard will destabilize the
market in the state. The federal government is new to the health in-
surance business, and each state presumably knows its own insurance
market better than the federal government. Thus, HHS should grant
the vast majority of state MLR adjustment requests, absent a compel-
ling reason not to.
Second, the federal government should release a short, clear
“cheat sheet” summarizing the most important aspects of the new
MLR regulations. As mentioned above, the MLR regulations are long,
complicated, and ambiguous. Insurance companies and state regula-
tory agencies need time to decipher the complex MLR requirements.
In the interim, a cheat sheet will help those affected by the new MLR
to formulate and implement an ideal short-term course of action
(e.g., through changed business practices and new statewide
regulations).
Finally, Congress should seriously consider repealing the ACA’s
MLR provision. It is constitutionally troublesome and a bad policy
219. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
220. See Letter from Gary Cohen, Acting Dir. Office of Oversight, Ctr. for Consumer
Info. & Ins. Oversight, to Brett J. Barrat, Nev. Comm’r Ins. (Apr. 25, 2011), http://cciio.
cms.gov/programs/marketreforms/mlr/states/nevada/nv_app_complete_4-25-11.pdf
(declaring Nevada’s application complete and setting a deadline of 30 days to issue a deci-
sion regarding Nevada’s MLR adjustment petition).
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judgment. As a practical matter, Congress will not likely pass a stand-
alone amendment to eliminate the MLR requirement. However, if
ACA opponents succeed in forcing significant changes to the law,
hopefully the MLR provisions will be on the chopping block. Alterna-
tively, if the courts strike down the ACA as unconstitutional (e.g., be-
cause of the Act’s individual mandate) Congress should leave the
MLR requirement out of any new healthcare reform legislation.
Conclusion
The United States desperately needs healthcare reform, and the
ACA provides it. In that regard, the ACA is a spectacular triumph. The
ACA will drastically improve many aspects of our broken healthcare
system by increasing competition (e.g., through the health insurance
exchanges) and covering more people (e.g., by expanding Medicaid).
The ACA is better than nothing, but it is not as effective as it could be,
and the MLR requirement embodies the worst aspects of the law: un-
constitutional government intervention into private businesses to the
detriment of both health insurance companies and American
consumers.
